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THE COMPROMISES PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS MUST
MAKE: THREE CASE STUDIES
Xander Kott1

Abstract
Elected prosecutors in the United States have facilitated mass incarceration, especially
since 1994. In response, activists have helped to elect progressive prosecutors at the local level.
This thesis examines whether prosecutors can achieve progressive goals, including increasing
the fairness of the criminal justice process, prosecuting police abuse, and reducing
incarceration. Based on three case studies, I find that prosecutors can reduce incarceration and
increase the fairness of the criminal justice process, but that they currently face significant
constraints in prosecuting police abuse. A prosecutor’s capacity to collaborate with more
conservative agents is the most crucial factor for success and depends on not prosecuting police
abuse, limiting the extent to which they reduce prosecutions, and, to a lesser degree, limiting how
far they go toward promoting a fairer criminal process.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the American criminal justice system has been
characterized by unprecedented incarceration rates, gaping racial disparities, and rampant police
abuse. In response, a coalition of racial justice activists, progressive Christians, liberal
billionaires, and nonprofit leaders have helped to elect progressive prosecutors at the local level.2
Progressive prosecutors now govern over 12 percent of the U.S. population because they have
come to power in major cities, including Philadelphia, Boston, and Brooklyn.3 This thesis
investigates whether progressive prosecutors can make a difference.
The movement to elect progressive prosecutors had a banner year in 2016, as shown in
Table 1. Kim Foxx was elected Chicago’s district attorney in 2016 to address police brutality.4 In
Houston Harris County, Texas, Kim Ogg was elected on a platform to decriminalize drug
offenses.5 Mark Gonzalez of Nueces County, Texas, stormed into office with a “not guilty” tattoo
across his chest.6 Larry Krasner had sued the police department 75 times as a civil rights lawyer
before becoming chief prosecutor of Philadelphia in 2017.7 As Heather Pickerell said,
progressive candidates “are now hitting the campaign trail en masse.”8 Scholars refer to members
Note, “The Paradox of ‘Progressive Prosecution,’” Harvard Law Review 132, no. 2 (December 2018):
751; Angela J. Davis, "Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement," UCLA Criminal
Justice Law Review 3, no. 1 (2019): 6; Benjamin Levin, "Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor,"
Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming, U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper 20-7, (2020): 8;
John Pfaff, "Why the Policy Failures of Mass Incarceration Are Really Political Failures," Minnesota Law
Review 104 (2019): 2691.
3
Emily Bazelon, Charged (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2019), 290.
4
Bruce Green et al., "Can a Good Person Be a Good Prosecutor in 2018?" Fordham Law Review Online
1 (2018): 10.
5
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 18.
6
David Alan Slansky, “The Progressive Prosecutor's Handbook,” UC Davis Law Review Online 50, no.
25 (2017): 26.
7
Jennifer Gonnerman, "Larry Krasner's Campaign to End Mass Incarceration," New Yorker, April 24,
2019; Alan Feuer, “He Sued Police 75 Times. Democrats Want Him as Philadelphia’s Top Prosecutor,”
New York Times, June 17, 2017.
8
Heather Pickerell, “Critical Race Theory and Power: The Case for Progressive Prosecution,” Harvard
BlackLetter Law Journal 73, no. 36 (2020): p. 73.
2
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of the new district attorney class as “progressive prosecutors”9 because they promise to reduce
prosecutions of ordinary people, reduce racial disparities, and prosecute police misconduct.
Table 1: Progressive prosecutors10

The fact that prosecutors such as Beth McCann, Wesley Bell, and Scott Colom are
winning elections on progressive agendas shows that the political winds are turning against mass
incarceration.11 Since 2018, however, there has been a lively debate in the literature about
Bruce Green and Rebecca Roiphe, “When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law Enforcers Then and
Now,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2020): 15.
10
Coding assistance from Clare Stevens, Oberlin College ‘21.
11
Green and Roiphe, “When Prosecutors Politick,” 1; Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 32.
9
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whether these newly elected prosecutors can achieve the movement’s progressive aspirations.
Leading advocates Angela J. Davis, Pickerell, and Emily Bazelon call progressive prosecution
“essential,”12 “imperative,”13 and “the most promising means of reform ... on the political
landscape,”14 respectively. It “has a lot going for it,” adds John Pfaff.15 David Alan Slansky,
Madison McWithey, Bruce Green, and Rebecca Roiphe are also advocates of the movement.16
By contrast, another set of scholars criticize progressive prosecution. “Count me a
skeptic,” says David Patton.17 Furthermore, the anonymous author of a prominent note for the
Harvard Law Review likens the criminal justice system to moldy bread and disparages
progressive prosecution as an attempt to eat around the mold. It is unclear why the Harvard
author is anonymous, but they are an early and prominent critic. “Let’s not get too excited,”
Abbe Smith adds.18 Additional critics of progressive prosecution include Rachel Barkow, Darcy
Covert, Maybell Romero, and Franklin Zimring.19
At the heart of the debate between these two scholarly camps is whether an elected
prosecutor can reduce incarceration, bring down racial disparities, and prosecute police
misconduct. Skeptics posit that various obstacles make progressive prosecution impossible,

Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 12.
Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 74.
14
Bazelon, Charged, 296.
15
John Pfaff, “A Second Step Act for the States (and Counties, and Cities),” Cardozo Law Review 41, no.
1 (December 2018): 6.
16
Slansky, “Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook”; Madison McWithey, “Taking a Deeper Dive into
Progressive Prosecution: Evaluating the Trend Through the Lens of Geography: Part One: Internal
Constraints,” Boston College Law Review E. Supp. 61, no. 32 (2020); Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in
2018.”
17
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 24.
18
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 5.
19
Rachel Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration (Cambridge: Belknap
Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2019); Darcy Covert, “Transforming the Progressive
Prosecutor Movement,” Wisconsin Law Review, Forthcoming, (2021); Maybell Romero, “Rural Spaces,
Communities of Color, and the Progressive Prosecutor,” Northwestern Law: the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 110, no. 4 (2020); Pfaff, “Political Failures.”
12
13
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especially over a sustained period and outside liberal districts.20 By contrast, proponents argue
that elected prosecutors can overcome these barriers because of their immense authority.21 In this
thesis, I focus on five barriers to progressive prosecution emphasized by skeptics in the literature,
focusing on office norms,22 police resistance,23 and the need to win re-election.24
In light of these challenges, I test whether and to what extent three case studies have
reached the progressive ideals: John Chisholm of Milwaukee County (elected in 2006), Melissa
Nelson of Jacksonville, Florida (elected in 2016), and Marilyn Mosby of Baltimore City,
Maryland (elected in 2014). I select these cases because the critics’ “paradox” critique, which I
expand on later, indicates that these three prosecutors should fail to achieve the progressive
prosecutor movement’s goals. Chisholm should disappoint because prosecutors cannot possibly
make progressive reforms and get re-elected multiple times. Nelson should fall short because she
was elected in a conservative district. Finally, Mosby should fail because a prominent skeptic
highlights her as evidence that progressive prosecution is impossible.
My approach is to analyze the level of progressive success that the three case studies
have found relative to their predecessors. To do so, I conduct 11 interviews, both on the phone
and over video chat, with participants who have familiarity with one or more of my case studies.
Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 82.
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 1.
22
Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 83; Note, “Paradox,'' 762; Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 15;
McWithey, “Internal Constraints,” 35-36; 37; Seema Gajwani and Max Lesser, “The Hard Truths of
Progressive Prosecution and a Path to Realizing the Movement’s Promise” New York Law School Law
Review 70, no. 64 (2019-2020): 79; 71; Nguyen, Hao Quang. "Progressive Prosecution: It’s Here, But
Now What?" Mitchell Hamline Law Review 46, no. 2 (2020): 342; Heather Pickerell, “How To Assess
Whether Your District Attorney Is A Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor,” Harvard Law & Policy Review
15, no. 1 (January 7, 2020): 12; Abbe Smith, “Prosecutors I Like: A Very Short Essay,” Ohio State
Journal of Criminal Law (2018-2019): 414.
23
Pickerell, “Bona Fide,” 5; Pickerell, “Race and Power”; Madison McWithey, “Taking a Deeper Dive
into Progressive Prosecution: Evaluating the Trend Through the Lens of Geography: Part Two: External
Constraints,” 61, no. 9 (March 2020): 50; Note, “Paradox,” 765.
24
Note, “Paradox,” 760; John Pfaff. Locked in: the true causes of mass incarceration—and how to
achieve real reform (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 171.
20
21
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Following the Oberlin College Institutional Review Board’s protocol for this thesis, the interview
subjects’ identities are kept confidential. The participants have direct knowledge about the
elected prosecutors analyzed in this thesis. The interview subjects include prosecutors, judges,
legislators, scholars, activists, and division captains. I also engaged in a general conversation
with a division captain that is not cited in this thesis but informs my thinking. The interviews are
semi-structured. The information collected in the interviews include the case study’s progressive
goals, challenges they face, and strategies they deploy to deal with those challenges. I
supplement the interviews by reviewing press releases and policy statements.
I also read law review articles and books covering my case studies and progressive
prosecution more generally. Moreover, I review articles in local and national news outlets
including Milwaukee Magazine, The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Urban Milwaukee, Milwaukee
Courier, Florida Times-Union, Tampa Bay Times, Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Magazine, The
Appeal, The New York Times, Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. The information I
collect allows me to evaluate each case study’s progressiveness across reducing incarceration,
increasing the fairness of the criminal judicial process, and prosecuting police crimes.
I predict that Mosby, Chisholm, and Nelson can reduce incarceration, reduce racial
disparities, and prosecute police misconduct. But only to the extent that Mosby, Chisholm, and
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Nelson rework the incentives and personnel within their office,25 develop a good working
relationship with the police force,26 and mobilize activists to build support for their policies.27
Based on my analysis of Chisholm, Nelson, and Mosby, I find that prosecutors can
reduce incarceration and increase the fairness of the criminal justice process but not prosecute
police abuse. Progressive prosecution is a compromise, not a paradox. A prosecutor must obtain
cooperation from more conservative actors, including the electorate, the police, and judges, in
order to reduce incarceration and increase the fairness of the criminal judicial process. Securing
cooperation from more conservative actors is integral for success but also demands compromise.
To be successful, prosecutors must make the following compromises. The first is with the
police: a prosecutor must not prosecute police abuse, one of the movement’s primary goals. The
second compromise is with legislators, judges, citizens, and the police: a prosecutor needs to
focus their reforms on nonviolent rather than violent crimes. The third compromise is with state
legislators, the police, and citizens: progressive prosecutors must enact diversion programs rather
than categorical refusals to prosecute a set of crimes. In addition to these three compromises in
conduct, elected prosecutors need to make a rhetorical compromise: they must demonstrate that
their reforms will benefit voters who do not experience the costs of over-incarceration. One
approach is by emphasizing the “return on investment” critique of mass incarceration. The
second strategy is to highlight the racial injustices of incarcerating low-level drug offenders. I
Slansky, “Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook,” 29-30; Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 26; Green et
al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 10; McWithey, “Internal Constraints,” 43-44; Pickerell, “Bona Fide
Progressive Prosecutor,” 12; Paul Butler, “A Conversation with Paul Butler About Progressive
Prosecutors,” interview by Kary Antholis, Editor’s Blog, Crime Story, February 24, 2020; Smith,
“Prosecutors I Like,” 420-421; But Gajwani and Lesser, “Hard Truths of Progressive Prosecution,” 79;
71.
26
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 24; Madison McWithey, “External Constraints,” 55; 56; But Note,
“Paradox,” 765.
27
Smith, “Prosecutors I Like,” 420; Pfaff, “A Second Step Act,” 21; Pfaff, Locked in, 206; Davis,
“Reimagining Prosecution,” 25.
25
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expand later on why two these specific rhetorical framings constitute a compromise. Moreover, a
prosecutor hoping to introduce progressive prosecution over time may even find it necessary to
distance themselves from the progressive prosecutor label.
These four concessions comprise what I term the “compromise of progressive
prosecution.” This argument is a response to the critics' “paradox of progressive prosecution”
claim that it is impossible for prosecutors to move toward progressive ideals due to resistance
from junior prosecutors, the police force, judges, state and local officials, and the electorate. I
find that collaboration with these conservative actors enables progress on two key goals of the
movement, reducing incarceration and reducing racial disparities. Notably, the compromise, with
these conservative agents looks differently in different places. The longer that a progressive
prosecutor serves in office, the easier it is for them to determine the compromises they must
make. My argument is also distinct from the other advocates, including Davis, Pickerell, Slansky,
and McWithey, because I stress that collaboration is not only a factor for success, but the most
key factor and that collaboration is at the same time the most key constraint. I use the term
collaboration to refer to the act of coordinating with more conservative actors in order to
introduce progressive reforms, such as diversion programs and conviction review units. These
reforms, to different degrees, demand cooperation from the police department, judges,
legislators, and citizens, among other more conservative actors.
Chisholm and Nelson both abstained from police prosecution and non-prosecution but
introduced diversion programs and increased data transparency. On the other hand, Mosby
prosecuted a major police killing and instructed her junior prosecutors not to charge a set of
crimes. In response to these non-compromises, the actors she depends on suppressed her
progressive reforms. For example, the police disregarded her non-prosecution order, and the
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governor assigned the state attorney general to handle violent crimes in her district.
Coalition-building and the corresponding concessions that it entails both develop a prosecutor’s
capacity to move toward the progressive ideal and restrict progress at the same time.
Part I shows that elected prosecutors promote mass incarceration, and Part II defines the
progressive prosecutor ideal. Part III specifies barriers to progressive prosecution, and then Part
IV clarifies strategies for moving those barriers. Parts V through VII describe three case studies’
success in moving toward the progressive prosecutor ideal and the compromises they made along
the way. I conclude in Part VIII that progressive prosecutors must concede prosecuting police
abuse and make other compromises in order to build the coalition of conservative agents that is
needed to reduce incarceration rates and increase the fairness of the judicial process.
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I.

HOW ELECTED PROSECUTORS PROMOTE MASS INCARCERATION
Local prosecutors

Local prosecutors possess significant discretionary authority in the administration of
criminal law, and they have used that discretionary authority to drive mass incarceration,
particularly since 1994. There are several theories in the literature for why prosecutors have used
their agency to promote mass incarceration.
There are three types of prosecutors in the United States: federal prosecutors, state
prosecutors, and local prosecutors. Federal prosecutors, officially known as United States
Attorneys, work for the Department of Justice. They enforce violations of federal criminal
statutes, such as federal tax evasion.28 State prosecutors, or State Attorneys General, handle
time-intensive violations of state criminal law, such as consumer protection and drug trafficking
cases.29 Finally, there is the local prosecutor’s office, which is the focus of this paper. Local
prosecutors deal with the most common state crimes, including drug possession, drunk driving,
assaults, burglaries, and murders.30 The local prosecutor’s office is run by the chief county
prosecutor, the District Attorney (DA).
The District Attorney is an elected official that serves as the top prosecutor in their
designated county.31 There are 2,400 district attorneys (DAs) across the U.S.32 These chief county
prosecutors supervise over 25,000 assistant district attorneys (ADAs).33. Since 95 percent of
cases are handled at the county level, DA’s play a crucial role in the criminal legal system. In
Lisa Williams and Iris Hsiao, "Sizing up the Prosecution: A Quick Guide to Local Prosecution."
Harvard Law School, last modified 2010, 4.
29
Williams and Hsiao, “Sizing up,” 4.
30
Williams and Hsiao, “Sizing up,” 4.
31
District attorneys are elected in every state except for Delaware, New Jersey, Alaska, and Connecticut:
Pfaff, Locked in, 128.
32
Pickerell, “Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor,” 8.
33
Pfaff, Locked in, 129; Jeffrey Bellin, “Theories of Prosecution,” California Law Review 108 (March 6,
2019): 1210.
28
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2017, President Obama noted that district attorneys have more authority over criminal justice
than the President of the United States.34 “Do what they just did in Philadelphia and Boston, and
elect state’s attorneys and district attorneys who are looking at issues in a new light,” he said,
referring to prosecutors Larry Krasner and Rachael Rollins.35
Prosecutors are powerful because they make charging, cash bail, and plea bargain
decisions. The charging decision is the most powerful tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal.36 After a
police officer makes an arrest, the prosecutor chooses whether to dismiss the case or file charges.
A dismissal allows the accused to walk free, while the decision to charge often leads to a
criminal conviction.37 The prosecutor also chooses which charges to select and how many to file.
The second important tool is the cash bail decision. If a prosecutor chooses to press charges, they
then decide whether or not to request cash bail. Cash bail is a tool for pressuring the accused to
return to court. If the accused cannot afford to pay the cash payment demanded by the court, they
are then held in jail as they wait for trial.38 This usually gives way to the third tool under the
prosecutor’s control: the management of plea bargain negotiations. Prosecutors may encourage
defendants to plead guilty rather than go to trial. They reach a plea agreement by threatening to
impose additional charges if the accused rejects the offer.39 Prosecutors find it easier to make
deals with jailed defendants. Since 1920, over 95% of criminal cases have been decided through
a deal between the prosecutor and the accused.40 It is through the charging, cash bail, and plea
bargain decisions at which a prosecutor can act more or less punitively.

Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 80.
Gonnerman, “Larry Krasner’s Campaign.”
36
Note, “Paradox,” 752.
37
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 9.
38
Adureh Onyekwere, "How Cash Bail Works," Brennan Center for Justice, last modified June 2, 2020.
39
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 5.
40
Nguyen, “Now What?” 333.
34
35
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Prosecutors have used the power of the plea-bargain, cash bail, and cash-bail decisions to
drive mass incarceration. As a result of decisions made by local prosecutors, the prison
population has boomed from from 300,00041 to over 1.5 million imprisoned people in the United
States.42 Most of the prison population is housed in state prisons, not federal prisons, as shown in
Figure 1. Local prosecutors are the actors who handle the cases that lead to incarceration in state
prisons, while federal prosecutors handle the cases that lead to incarceration in federal prisons.
Figure 1: State and federal incarceration rates over time43

Alexander, New Jim Crow, 6.
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 3.
43
Data from Prison Policy Initiative, “Incarceration Counts and Rates, 1925-2016,”
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/data/incarceration_counts_and_rates_by_type_over_time.xlsx; Jennifer
Bronson and E. Ann Carson. "Prisoners in 2017," Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2019,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf; Carson, E. Ann. "Prisoners in 2018." U.S. Department of
Justice: Office of Justice Programs, April 2020, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf; Jacob
Kang-Brown, Chase Montagnet, Eital Schattner-Elmaleh, and Oliver Hinds, "People in Prison 2019,"
Vera Evidence Brief, May 2020.
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/people-in-prison-in-2019.pdf.
41
42
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Local Prosecutors Drive Mass Incarceration
Almost 90% of the incarcerated population are held in state prisons,44 and local
prosecutors helped drive the 700% expansion in the state prison population that has occurred
over a 40 year period.45 The carceral process at the state level begins when a city police officer
makes an arrest and brings the case to the local prosecutor’s office.46 From there, the individual
will be sent to a state prison only if the local prosecutor decides to file charges and goes on to
reach a conviction.47 Prosecutors have the discretion to not file charges even if they have the
evidence to secure a conviction.48 In other words, they can dismiss a case for any reason.
Furthermore, Angela J. Davis says that prosecutors have full discretion to offer a more or less
generous plea offer.49 Ronald Wright additionally notes that judges and state legislatures
generally refrain from exercising oversight over these decisions.50 In that way, the chief local
prosecutor is “the most unregulated actor in our criminal legal process,” says Paul Butler.51
Elected prosecutors are unregulated largely because they are executive branch officials, but the
lack of regulation opens the doors to the abuse of power.52
John Pfaff identifies local prosecutors as the driving factor behind mass incarceration
since 1994. Between 1994 and 2008, crime rates fell by over 30% and arrest rates fell by 10%.
At the same time, local prosecutors increased the rate at which they filed felony charges by
40%.53 For that reason, “the primary driver of incarceration is increased prosecutorial toughness
Pfaff, Locked In, 13.
Pfaff, Locked In, 13; Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 77.
46
Pfaff, Locked In, 70.
47
Pfaff, Locked In, 70.
48
Nguyen, “Now What?” 333.
49
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 5.
50
Ronald Wright, “How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us,” Wake Forest University Legal Studies Paper, no.
1339939 (Feb. 2009): 581.
51
Butler, “Conversation.”
52
Green and Roiphe, “Prosecutors Politick,” 32.
53
Pfaff, Locked In, 71.
44
45
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when it comes to charging people.”54 Additionally, Angela J. Davis has shown that prosecutorial
discretion has contributed to racial disparities in terms of who is sent to prison and for how
long.55 Pfaff and Davis show that elected local prosecutors have exercised wide authority and
limited oversight to increase incarceration rates and racial disparities. In doing so, they have
developed what scholars call a win-at-all-costs culture. Still, not all tough prosecutors are
ill-intentioned. For example, during his time as a defense lawyer, James Forman Jr. encountered
a “breed of race-conscious black prosecutors who prodded the system to value the lives of black
victims.”56
While scholars agree that prosecutors have gotten harsher, John Pfaff says that there are
no straightforward answers for why that occurred. One factor is that state politicians gave local
prosecutors the tools to imprison more people, say Pickerell and Pfaff.57 State legislatures passed
strict sentencing laws that made the risk of going to trial greater, notes John Pfaff.58 “Tell your
client to take the deal or we go to trial,” James Forman Jr. quotes a prosecutor telling him during
his time as a public defense attorney.59
Political considerations provide another explanation for harsh prosecution. Forman Jr.
says that citizens around the country started pressuring elected officials to take action against
rising crime beginning in the 1970s.60 The fact that citizens were successfully pressuring for
action is possible because the United States is one of only a small number of countries where
prosecutors are elected.61 The outsized power of white suburbanites and bottom-up anti-crime
Pfaff, Locked In, 6.
Davis, “Reimagining Prosecution,” 4.
56
James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux: 2017), 224.
57
Pickerell, “Race and Power,” 77; Pfaff, Locked In, 135-136.
58
Pfaff, Locked In, 30.
59
Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own, 124.
60
Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own.
61
Ronald Wright, “Beyond Prosecutor Elections,” SMU Law Review 3, no.11 (2014): 1.
54
55
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organizing are two specific political forces that made public prosecutors get tougher. Emily
Bazelon says that “conviction rates are the statistic many D.A.s cite in seeking re-election.”62
Related to the need to get re-elected, Pfaff and Slansky also make the “steppingstone”
claim.63 This is the idea that prosecutors got tougher to serve their long-term political needs.
Local prosecutors became more influential during the war on crime.64 They enjoyed more
influence, note Benjamin Levin and Maybell Romero, because state politicians passed harsh
criminal laws and judges promoted unchecked discretion.65 Moreover, John Pfaff points out that
the profession became more prestigious because of public panic over crime as well as glowing
depictions of prosecutors in TV shows and movies. 66 Increased power and attention may have
strengthened their ability to rise up the political ranks, says Pfaff.67 In short, John Pfaff’s and
David Alan Slansky’s “steppingstone” argument is that prosecutors are harsh to bolster their
resumes for higher office.68
Tough laws and political dynamics are not the only variables that promote tough
prosecution. John Pfaff emphasizes what he calls the “prosecutorial moral hazard problem.”69 He
says that prosecutors send people to prison for free. On the other hand, prosecutors feel a
financial cost when they send an individual to jail or put them into a diversion program. That
occurs because prisons are funded by the state while jails and diversion programs are funded by
the county. And the prosecutor's office is funded by the county, not the state.70 In turn, says Pfaff,
Bazelon, Charged, 18.
Pfaff, Locked In, 139; David Alan Slansky, “The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors,” Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 14, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2828803 (2017): 649.
64
Levin, “Imagining,” 5; Romero, “Rural Spaces,” 9; Pfaff, Locked In, 140.
65
Levin, “Imagining,” 5; Romero, “Rural Spaces,” 9.
66
Pfaff, Locked in, 140.
67
Pfaff, Locked in, 139.
68
Pfaff, Locked in, 139-140, Slansky, “Changing Political Landscape,” 648-649.
69
Pfaff, “Political Failures,” 2673.
70
Pfaff, Locked In, 142-143.
62
63
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prosecutors have a financial motivation to secure a felony conviction rather than a misdemeanor
or a treatment alternative.71
In this section I argued that elected prosecutors are influential actors in the criminal legal
system, and that the dominant “win at all costs” model of prosecution has contributed to mass
incarceration. I then highlighted theories from the literature about why prosecutors have become
more aggressive since 1994. The next matter I address is what a “progressive” model of
prosecution would look like.

71

Pfaff, Locked In, 145.
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II.

THE PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTOR IDEAL

Benjamin Levin’s framework captures the three core aims of the progressive prosecutor
movement: reduce prison and jail time for ordinary people, safeguard defendant’s rights, and
prosecute police misconduct. I combine these three goals and their corresponding policies into a
three-planked model of the “ideal” progressive prosecutor. Sketching the ideal allows us to
envision what progressive prosecution would look like if it were advanced to the fullest extent.
There is no consensus definition of progressive prosecutor in the literature, but Levin’s ideal
model captures advocates’ varied aspirations. It should also be noted that Levin splits up the
three planks into separate ideal types, while I bring the planks together into one framework of the
ideal progressive prosecutor. In the following sections, I discuss barriers to the ideal, strategies
for softening those barriers, and then analyze three case studies to determine whether, and if so,
to what extent, the progressive ideal can be realized in light of internal and external barriers.
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Figure 2: Progressive prosecutor ideal metrics72

While the dominant “win-at-all-costs” model of prosecution drives mass incarceration, a
group of scholars, activists, nonprofits, and donors contend that a model of progressive
prosecution, shown in Figure 2, is possible.73 This model is based on Colorado Law Professor
Benjamin Levin’s argument that advocates have various ideas for what progressive prosecution
should entail.74

Coding assistance from Clare Stevens, Oberlin College ‘21.
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 8; Bazelon, Charged, xxvii.
74
Levin, “Imagining,” 2-3.
72
73
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Levin categorizes these ideas into three core principles: procedural justice, carceral
progressivism, and anti-carceral prosecution.75 Procedural justice, Levin explains, means
engaging in proper conduct.76 To do so, a prosecutor must administer the law in a fair and
unbiased fashion.77 Carceral progressivism, Levin’s second principle, involves focusing on
crimes by elites, including police officers, corporations, and politicians.78 Finally, anti-carceral
prosecution demands that the prosecutor pull back the criminal legal system entirely.79 Taken
together, Levin’s three-pronged ideal consists of protecting defendants’ rights, punishing the
powerful, and reducing criminal punishment for ordinary people. This model is shown above in
Figure 2, with increasing levels of intensity as you move down the graph.
A. Procedural justice
The first plank of Levin’s model is procedural justice. Procedural justice demands that a
prosecutor operate the mechanics of criminal law in accordance with fairness.80 One way a
prosecutor can fulfill this principle is by addressing racial bias in prosecutions.81 For instance,
Margaret Moore of Travis County, Texas enlisted researchers to identify points where racial
imbalances occurred. After finding that the arrests were the driving factor, Moore worked with
the police department to address the issue.82 Other prosecutors, including Dan Satterberg of
Milwaukee and Beth McCann of Denver, have also brought in researchers to investigate racial
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disparities.83 Furthermore, Chicago’s chief prosecutor Kim Foxx and several other prosecutors
have introduced implicit bias training.84
Leading prosecution expert Angela J. Davis encourages prosecutors to monitor and
address racial disparities.85 She notes that racial imbalances in prisons are driven in no small part
(25 percent) by racial discrimination within the criminal process.86 The additional 75 percent, she
says, is fueled by: “... poverty, lack of education, and high unemployment in communities of
color — all of which are impacted by race discrimination in society as a whole.”87 When it
comes to drug crimes, discrimination by criminal officials drives half the racial imbalances, says
Davis.88 In that way, Davis highlights both the value and the limits of racial progressivism in
prosecution. The value is that reducing racial discrimination from within the system will reduce
racial disparities, particularly for drug crimes. The limit is that even in the absence of
discrimination from within, there will be external discrimination that sustains racial disparities.
In addition to addressing racial disparities, Levin asserts that the procedural ideal requires
guarding against wrongful convictions.89 Heather Pickerell notes that reform-minded prosecutors
including Wesley Bell, Kim Foxx, Larry Krasner, and Melissa Nelson have established
“conviction integrity units.”90 These units investigate claims of innocence. The staff members
then help free innocent individuals and clear their records.91
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Scholars also mention benefits and limits to a focus on wrongful convictions. Levin notes
that the government should not incarcerate people who are innocent.92 For example, if a
prosecutor secures a conviction based on a coerced confession or inaccurate scientific evidence,
the verdict should be overthrown, says Abbe Smith. 93 After all, that person may not have
committed the offense. Even if they did, our process requires that prosecutors prove that the
offense occurred, note Seema Gajwani and Max Lesser.94
Still, Benjamin Levin, Heather Pickerell and Abbe Smith say there are downsides to
focusing primarily on people who are incarcerated due to mistakes in the criminal process.95
Namely, that the incarceration of the innocent is the exception and not the norm. Renowned
scholar and defense lawyer Abbe Smith say, “I run a ‘Guilty Project,’ not an Innocence
Project.”96 Scholars say we can miss important issues when we place an outsized focus on
wrongful convictions. Doing so, they say, may fail to consider what the right response entails
when the defendant does commit the crime and the conviction does accord with proper
procedure.97
Procedural justice also requires that a prosecutor avoid cases that are based on unlawful
or discriminatory police practices, says Levin.98 Vida B. Johnson points to a case in Baltimore in
which a police officer planted evidence on citizens.99 Additionally, Michelle Alexander describes
racist policing against young poor Black communities as part of the War on Drugs.100 Moreover,
Abbe Smith and other scholars observe that police officers often lie when they get on the witness
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stand to testify against a defendant: the issue is so common that scholars nickname it
“testilying.”101 These scholars say that a prosecutor committed to fair procedure should address
illegal searches, discriminatory arrests, and dishonest police testimony. In Heather Pickerell’s
2020 article for the Harvard Law and Policy Review, she praises Philadelphia district attorney
Larry Krasner’s decision to compile and release a list of police officers with poor track records.
Krasner’s “do-not-call” list helps his assistant prosecutors avoid questionable police officers.102
Furthermore, scholars say that procedural justice requires that a prosecutor avoid pressing
excessive charges. John Pfaff notes that prosecutors often file more charges than they can prove
in court, a practice called “overcharging,” according to Angela J. Davis. 103 In doing so,
prosecutors incentivize the defendant to agree to a plea deal rather than risk trial, says Pfaff.104
Angela J. Davis notes that district attorney Larry Krasner banned his subordinates from bringing
murder charges at a level higher than could be proven in court, “the era of trying to get away
with the highest charge regardless of the facts is over,” he stated.105
There are other ways for prosecutors to advance fair process. For example, Hao Quang
Nguyen suggests that prosecutors factor immigration consequences into their decisions.106
Nguyen states that the conviction of a noncitizen may put them at risk for deportation. He points
out that two similarly situated defendants who are found guilty of the same offense could face
different outcomes if one of them is an undocumented immigrant.107 Since this is unequal,
Nguyen says that prosecutors should hire immigration experts to help the office avoid
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unwarranted deportations.108 He celebrates prosecutors who have taken that step,109 such as
Brooklyn prosecutor Eric Gonzalez.110
Moreover, David Alan Slansky recommends that prosecutors hand over ample evidence
to the defense attorney.111 In Brady v. Maryland (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that the
prosecutor must hand over “material exculpatory evidence” to the defense.112 That is, a
prosecutor must reveal evidence to the defense if there is a “reasonable probability” that it would
impact the conclusion of the case.113 For example, Jeffrey Bellin says that if the prosecutor has
information that would undermine confidence in an important witness, they must hand it over to
the defense lawyer.114
In addition to evidence disclosure, Jeffrey Bellin warns against striking jury members
because of their race.115 The Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in the 1985 case Batson
v. Kentucky, for a prosecutor to engage in racial discrimination during the jury selection
process.116 But there are countless loopholes for escaping Batson and it is a herculean task for the
defense to prove that the prosecutor struck a jury member specifically because of their race.117
Bellin says that elected prosecutors should instill the importance of following the Batson ruling
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to their staff, even when junior prosecutors know they can get away with breaking Batson.118 By
stressing the importance of Batson compliance, the elected prosecutor will reduce the number of
convictions tainted by a racial bias.
Moreover, David Alan Slansky and Jeffrey Bellin say that prosecutors should reduce
reliance on unreliable forensic evidence, as well as informants.119 Forensic evidence refers to
scientific testimony or the presentation of scientific evidence in court. Scholars of criminal law
say that a lot of forensic evidence brought forward is untrustworthy. In fact, many wrongful
convictions are driven by dubious forensic evidence. So-called expert analysis of bitemarks in
court, for instance, have been linked to a host of wrongful convictions according to a 2016 study
by the Texas Forensic Evidence Commission.120 Bazelon recommends that prosecutors avoid the
categories of forensic evidence that are known to be unreliable, investigate the veracity of
experts’ claims, and stay up to date with the scientific literature to ensure that the evidence
presented is still considered valid by scholars.121
Scholars also say that relying on informants drives wrongful convictions, and often leads
to Brady violations.122 When prosecutors call on an informant for testimony, they will often fail
to disclose information to the defense that casts doubt on the trustworthiness of the witness.123
The main issue with informants though, is that they are not trustworthy. As Bellin says, “The
case relies on a jailhouse informant who claims he heard the defendant confess. Really?”124 In
turn, a prosecutor who is committed to procedural justice reduces reliance on informant
testimony.
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Taken together, Levin’s procedural justice ideal demands that a prosecutor administer
criminal law in a measured and unbiased fashion.125 Scholars suggest that an ideal procedural
prosecutor would eliminate racial discrimination, overturn wrongful convictions, avoid wrongful
convictions, and not overcharge. Scholars also recommend that they account for deportations,
improve evidence disclosure, not strike jury members because of their race, and refuse false
police testimony. Proponents argue that these procedural repairs would make the criminal legal
system more equitable and restrained. The policies fall under procedural justice because they
smooth out the criminal legal process.126 In order to advance the procedural justice ideal, elected
prosecutors need to convince citizens that protecting defendants’ rights is a worthwhile endeavor,
which I expand on in Part III and IV.
Maybell Romero, a critic, says that procedural justice principles are “... standards as low
as abiding by the most basic constitutional strictures upon their role.”127 David Alan Slansky, on
the other hand says that procedural justice makes the legal system “... fairer, more humane, and
more effective.”128 Slansky notes the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct to show the need
for process reforms.129 Still, as the Harvard author warns, these policies might provide “a patina
of morality to a fundamentally immoral system.”130 Levin also asserts that procedural justice sets
a low ceiling because following professional standards will not address the external forces that
drive mass incarceration, which are poverty and racial oppression.131 But as Angela J. Davis says,
“an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach will achieve nothing.” 132 For that reason, the progressive
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prosecutor exemplar should introduce procedural justice, which is the first plank of the three-part
ideal.
B. Carceral progressivism
The second plank of Levin’s ideal model is carceral progressivism.133 Carceral
progressivism is the view that criminal punishment should further left-wing social and economic
goals, says Levin.134 For example, a carceral progressive might prosecute police officers who
commit violence. Many reform-minded prosecutors were elected after anti-Black police killings:
the victories of Michael O’Malley (Cuyahoga County, Ohio), Kim Foxx (Chicago) and Wesley
Bell (Ferguson, Missouri) occurred after police killings of Tamir Rice, Laquan McDonald, and
Michael Brown, respectively.135 In each of these cases, the incumbent prosecutor failed to convict
the police officers.136 Additionally, commentators have called district attorney Marilyn Mosby a
progressive prosecutor after she prosecuted the police officers who killed Freddie Gray.137
Traditionally, prosecutors handle the police shooting charging decision, but often bring a weak
case to the grand jury. A prosecutor might instead appoint a district attorney in a nearby county,
the state attorney general, or a different special prosecutor to determine whether or not to press
charges in police misconduct cases.
The anonymous author of the Harvard Law note says that prosecutors who seek to reign
in police misconduct often face backlash from police officers, the police union, and the police
commissioners.138 Because the prosecutor’s office is connected to the police department,139 it is
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hard for prosecutors to confront the police, says Madison McWithey and a host of other
scholars.140 But advocates of progressive prosecution contend prosecutors should still do so. Vida
B. Johnson says there are a range corrupt police practices, including lying, wrongful searches,
racist policing, brutality, and murder that have eroded public trust in the criminal legal system.
Johnson acknowledges that it is hard for prosecutors to stand up to their law enforcement
partners. But she says that prosecutors are the only actors that currently have the ability to do
so.141
Beyond prosecuting police violence, carceral progressives may look to oppose perceived
economic injustice, Levin explains.142 For instance, district attorney Chesa Boudin (San
Francisco) established an Economic Crimes Against Workers Unit. The unit focuses on crimes
committed by firms against workers.143 Additionally, Levin notes that Tiffany Cabán, a district
attorney candidate in Queens, New York, promised to take on landlord crimes on the campaign
trail.144 The efforts of Boudin and Cabán show the belief that criminal law can serve as a check
on employers and landlords. This belief indicates carceral progressivism can expand beyond
prosecuting lawbreaking police officers and into prosecuting corporate and landlord abuse.
Carceral progressivism may also involve focusing on identity-based crimes, such as sex
crimes and hate crimes, says Levin.145 For example, Chesa Boudin pledged to “test every rape
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kit” and Brooklyn district attorney Eric Gonzalez established a Dedicated Hate Crimes Bureau.146
Addressing sex crimes and hate crimes aims to promote social justice through prosecutions. In
short, carceral progressivism comes in different forms but the idea is punishing the powerful or
focusing on crimes against subjugated groups.147
Critical race theorist Richard Delgado, a proponent of carceral progressivism, calls for
prosecutors to pursue “with vigor, energy, and imagination white collar crimes, bribery, political
corruption, civil rights criminal violations, consumer fraud, and other cases that seek to reinforce
democracy by convicting those who endanger it.”148 Benjamin Levin, a critic, says there are risks
to adopting this approach. Carceral progressivism, he says, demands more criminalization.149
Criminalizing more types of conduct in general, does not help marginalized communities
according to Levin.150 Richard Delgado, on the other hand, calls on prosecutors to prosecute the
powerful and at the same time work to replace the current prison state with a new system.151
When I evaluate the level of success that each of my case studies have achieved relative
to their predecessor on carceral progressivism, I focus on police prosecution. For one, several
prosecutors were elected after incidents of unpunished police brutality. Moreover, police
prosecution was an important issue in both Chisholm’s and Mosby’s campaigns. Third,
progressive prosecutor advocates emphasize the importance of fair and transparent investigations
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of police misconduct. Finally, prosecuting the police provides a hard test for carceral
progressivism because elected prosecutors work closely with the police force.
My focus on prosecuting police abuse is not to say that prosecuting other powerful actors,
including elected officials and landlords is not an interesting area to explore. It should also be
mentioned that I exclude the prosecution of sex crimes and hate crimes in my analysis of carceral
progressivism. These crimes are not always committed by powerful actors, as Levin points
out.152 In turn, ramping up the prosecutions of crimes that are committed by ordinary people does
not further a progressive-oriented model of prosecution.
C. Anti-carceral prosecution
The final tenet of Levin’s three-pronged ideal is anti-carceral prosecution. Anti-carceral
prosecution encompasses policies that reduce or eliminate criminal prosecutions and capital
punishment.153 There are three core policies that slash incarceration rates: diversion programs,
non-prosecution orders, and reducing cash-bail requests. In addition, the anti-carceral prosecutor
should support political efforts to expand the social safety net. That measure is necessary because
a stronger welfare system will ensure that individuals do not need to turn to crime to support
themselves. Moreover, the ideal anti-carceral prosecutor would never seek the death penalty.
A diversion program generally refers to a treatment or community-based sanction
alternative. Notably, diversion programs cannot be single-handedly put in place by an elected
prosecutor. Diversion demands “significant time and money,” says prosecutor scholar Madison
McWithey.154 For example, an interview subject with direct experience in a prosecutor’s office
told me that when a prosecutor seeks to implement a diversion program, the key question they
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have to answer is: “Divert to what?”155 Often, elected prosecutors partner with a nonprofit or a
community group to develop a treatment program.156 Beyond the treatment program itself,
diversion can only be put in place in a systematic manner if it is set by the state legislature into
statutory law.157 Finally, there is the crucial question of funding. Generally, these programs are
funded by the state legislature. That can present limits on the reach of the program. In
Milwaukee, for example, the state legislature stipulates that diversion can only be applied to
cases with nonviolent offenders.158 In addition, funding for diversion can be obtained from
federal grants or donations from nonprofits, foundations, or philanthropies. Even so, these
sources of funding are more fragile.159 Moreover, diversion requires participation from
defendants, public defenders, police officers, and judges. Often there is pressure from judges and
correctional actors to move through cases fast, which can present an obstacle to gaining the
cooperation of the courts.160 In short, diversion programs require the following to be put in place
systematically: statutory law that sets the parameters, funding from the state or from outside
donors, an external community group to handle the program, and buy-in from the court.
Levin notes that a chief prosecutor may also reduce criminal prosecutions by ordering her
assistants to not charge certain crimes.161 Top prosecutor Larry Krasner of Philadelphia, for
example, ordered his assistant prosecutors to not bring charges for possession of marijuana or
marijuana equipment.162 Critics call non-prosecution orders dangerous and undemocratic.163
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Advocates on the other hand, respond that these bold orders reduce incarceration and that district
attorneys are elected officials.164
Beyond non-prosecution orders, an anti-carceral prosecutor might establish restorative
justice programs. As Seema Gajwani and Max Lesser explain, restorative justice is a formal
conversation between the offender, the victim, and the victim’s family.165 Through the
conversation, they make an arrangement for how the person who committed the offense should
make it up to the victim.166 Gajwani and Lesser argue that restorative justice allows for mutual
healing and accountability, while incarceration causes destruction for both victims and people
who commit crimes.167
In addition to restorative justice, an anti-carceral prosecutor should reduce cash bail.
During the stretch between the arrest and the final verdict, the accused person enjoys the
presumption of innocence.168 Nevertheless, a judge may require the defendant to post a cash
payment as a way to ensure they return to court.169 If the accused person pays bail and appears at
subsequent hearings, the court will return the money.170 On the other hand, if the defendant
cannot make bail, they will be held in jail until the case concludes,171 which can take several
months or even over a year.172
Emily Bazelon says that the judge considers two factors when they determine bail: “flight
risk” and “rearrest risk.”173 These terms refer to the likelihood that the defendant will not show
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up to court and the likelihood that the accused person will commit another crime in the runup to
trial, respectively.174 A high bail amount aims to guard against these risks. For one, high bail
motivates defendants to return to trial. Second, high bail can lead to incarceration before trial,
and thereby prevent the accused person from harming the general public.
Despite these aims, scholars point out problems. A prevalent criticism is that cash bail
puts a price tag on freedom. As Hao Quang Nguyen says, “Plainly put, rich people can pay for
freedom while poor people cannot.”175 Another criticism is that cash bail decisions are racist. The
Brennan Center for Justice notes that “Black and Latino men [are] assessed higher bail amounts
than white men for similar crimes by 35 and 19 percent on average, respectively.” Finally, high
cash bail expands the jail population: the Brennan Center for Justice finds that 70% of people in
jail are waiting for trial.176 Moreover, as Michelle Alexander notes, the vast majority of
individuals in jail cells, sixty-six percent, earn less than $12,000 a year before detainment.177
Given that high cash-bail increases the jail population and causes disproportionate harm
to poor people of color, the anti-carceral prosecutor should oppose cash bail. Moreover, choices
made by prosecutors influence the judge’s bail decision. For example, Emily Bazelon highlights
the New York City Criminal Justice Agency’s finding that the prosecutor's bail recommendation
serves as the most important predictor of a judge’s bail decision.178
The decision to ask for less bail may also reduce criminal convictions. Sitting in a jail cell
makes the process of waiting for trial harder. It additionally puts more pressure on a defendant to
plead guilty, says Slansky.179 Individuals incarcerated before trial have a 400% greater chance of
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serving prison time compared to their non-jailed counterparts, per the Brennan Center for
Justice.180 As Emily Bazelon says, “Bail is the first domino in a series of decisions affecting
guilty pleas and penalties.”181
Many prosecutors have taken measures to reduce bail. Heather Pickerell contends that
district attorneys Michael O’Malley, Kim Foxx, Wesley Bell, and Larry Krasner passed the most
progressive bail policies out of their colleagues. These prosecutors have taken two steps to
address bail. First, their offices no longer ask for cash bail in low-level, non-violent crimes.
Second, they have discouraged their subordinate prosecutors from requesting excessive bail.182
These steps will help bring down the number of people incarcerated prior to trial.
In addition to diversion, non-prosecution, and forgoing cash bail requests for specific
crimes, the anti-carceral prosecutor should work with activists to fight for more robust social
policy, says Maybell Romero.183 They would also pressure legislators to reduce funding for the
police department and the prosecutor’s office, as racial justice activists have called for.184 In sum,
the third part of Levin's ideal is cutting the criminal state (anti-carceral prosecution).185
Taken together, the ideal anti-carceral prosecutor reduces the reach of the carceral state.
They order their subordinates to not prosecute certain crimes, expand diversion, establish
restorative justice programs, and do not ask for bail for certain crimes. Furthermore, they
demand an increase in funding for social services and a decrease in funding for the prison
apparatus. There are a few additional measures that do not fall neatly into one of the three ideal
planks. More specifically, the prosecutor should take a more merciful approach to juvenile
Onyekwere, “Cash Bail.”
Bazelon, Charged, 37.
182
Pickerell, “Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor,” 24.
183
Romero, “Rural Spaces,” 11.
184
Levin, “Imagining,” 28.
185
Levin, “Imagining.”

180

181

34

justice, invite activist monitoring, and lobby the state legislature to reduce penalties for various
criminal laws, or otherwise repeal criminal laws.
The paragon of progressive prosecution
The ideal progressive prosecutor, in Levin’s analysis, eliminates misconduct from within
the system (procedural justice), prosecutes the powerful (carceral progressivism), and brings
down incarceration rates (anti-carceral prosecution).186 Proponents of the progressive prosecutor
project, including Davis, Bazelon, Pickerell, McWithey, Slansky, and Pfaff, believe prosecutors
can adopt these principles. Figure 2: Progressive prosecutor ideal metrics contains the core
policies that advance each plank of the ideal ranked in order of progressivism
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III.

BARRIERS TO THE IDEAL

But an opposing scholarly camp, which includes the anonymous Harvard author, Smith,
Patton, Barkow, and Romero are skeptical. They argue that a set of internal and external barriers
make the ideal impossible.187 In this section, I discuss the five barriers to progressive prosecution
emphasized by skeptics of the progressive prosecutor project. The first barrier, office norms, is
internal, while the four additional barriers, the police, judges, state and local officials, and the
electorate, are external. My argument in this section is that the skeptics’ position brings us to the
conclusion that internal and external forces make the progressive ideal impossible. Table 2:
Barriers and responses provides the set of obstacles that skeptics claim make the ideal
impossible. Table 2 also includes the advocates’ responses to these obstacles, which I elaborate
on in Part IV.
A. Office norms
Urban prosecutors offices are elaborate organizations.188 Skeptics of progressive
prosecution assert that office culture is a force that restricts a prosecutor from achieving the
progressive ideal.189 Urban chief prosecutors oversee between one and eight hundred assistant
prosecutors, depending on the office.190 Elected prosecutors oversee this staff, rather than try
cases.191 On the other hand, assistant prosecutors, also known as “line prosecutors,” run cases.192
They make the day-to-day charging, cash bail, plea bargain, and evidence disclosure decisions.
There are too many assistant prosecutors, and too many decisions, for the elected prosecutor to
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track every action.193 As a result, the assistants have the opportunity to disobey the chief in
countless ways.194 Junior prosecutors with different visions may continue to overcharge, request
high cash bail, and withhold evidence from the defense attorney.195 Managing subordinates is a
challenge for progressive prosecutors because many junior prosecutors joined the profession in
order to develop their trial skills or to lock up the perceived bad guys.196 As McWithey points
out, these prosecutors are often enthusiastic about promoting defendants’ rights and reducing
incarceration.197
But even progressive-oriented prosecutors can become harsher over time.198 Gajwani and
Lesser argue that there are a few factors that cause prosecutors of all philosophies to become
tougher. First, prosecutors primarily hear about the accused from police officers and victims.199
That gives them a limited view of the defendant. Second, prosecutors and defense lawyers often
have a hostile relationship due to the competitive culture in criminal litigation.200 Prosecutors
may direct that hostility to the defendant.201 Emily Bazelon noted assistant prosecutors in
Brooklyn request cash bail against DA Erik Gonzalez’s orders. Bazelon also saw Brooklyn line
prosecutors file charges on the non-prosecution list, ignore the evidence disclosure policy, and
stand by a disreputable police officer.202 In sum, skeptics of progressive prosecution assert
assistant prosecutors may undermine a chief prosecutor’s efforts to improve procedural fairness
and reduce incarceration.
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B. Police
Skeptics of progressive prosecution contend that the police force is the second obstacle
that constrains a prosecutor from achieving the progressive ideal.203 Prosecutors rely on police
officers204 because the police force is the first screen in the criminal justice system.205 A police
officer makes an arrest and then contacts the district attorney’s office with the police report.206
Furthermore, police officers are responsible for conducting investigations prior to making an
arrest.207 The police force engages in these activities independently from the prosecutor’s
office.208 Despite the independence, the DA’s office relies on the police force to conduct
investigations, make arrests, and testify against defendants.209 These responsibilities give the
police force the chance to obstruct the progressive ideal.
An interview participant who studies prosecution said they saw a growing divide between
the police force and the urban communities in a range of different cities.210 Members of the
police force, the interview subject told, me “live in whiter, suburban communities. They are
often whiter than the people they’re policing everyday.”211 Moreover, the police union is a
powerful political force that is forceful in its opposition to policies that reduce police power.212
At the same time, the police union is disconnected from other labor unions in the area.213 In
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addition, the police force is generally more conservative than any given urban county electorate.
For example, the Philadelphia police union president, someone who was elected by officers in
the union but not by the voters of Philadelphia, called Krasner’s campaign “hilarious,” and
Krasner’s base “parasites of the city.”214 In short, the police force, the police union, and police
officers tend to be whiter, more suburban, more rural and more conservative than the voting
bases that have elected progressive prosecutors.
A progressive prosecutor might order their subordinates to not prosecute certain crimes in
order to reduce incarceration. The police commissioner, however, can order police officers to
keep making arrests for the crimes on the nonprosecution list.215 The defendants then have to sit
in jail until the prosecutor dismisses the case.216 When a police officer arrests and jails a
defendant, “the process itself becomes the punishment.,” as Jeffrey Bellin points out.217 Police
officers can also reduce a prosecutor’s ability to ensure procedural justice. A progressive chief
prosecutor might tell her subordinates to not work with dishonest police officers and to penalize
police perjury. In response, the police force may refuse to help the district attorney’s office with
cases.218
Additionally, a progressive prosecutor may prosecute police officers who commit crimes
or establish an independent entity to prosecute police misconduct. In response, the police union
and the police commissioner might criticize or launch attack ads against the chief prosecutor.219
In short, police officers can both refuse to comply with the DA’s office and attack them
politically. Both of these tactics threaten a prosecutor’s ability to decrease incarceration, increase
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procedural fairness, and secure convictions against police officers who engage in criminal
conduct. Due to the close connection between the police and the prosecutor office and the
ideological leanings of most police forces, skeptics posit that the police force constrains the
progressive ideal.
C. Judges
A third external pressure against the progressive prosecutor ideal mentioned in the
literature is judges. To clarify, skeptics of progressive prosecution place greater emphasis on
junior prosecutors and the police force as threats to the ideal, but scholars also mention judges as
an additional barrier. Most state judges in the U.S. are elected.220 Judges have the final say on
sentencing, cash bail, and plea bargains.221 If a judge disagrees with a prosecutor’s requested
sentence, they can impose a higher sentence. Furthermore, a judge can demand cash bail against
a prosecutor’s wishes.222 Finally, the judge may reject a plea deal that they believe to be too
lenient.223 Under the traditional model of prosecution, judges sign off on prosecutor’s requests.224
But progressive prosecutors often face judicial resistance.225 For instance, judges in Chicago have
set bail higher than the amount requested by Kim Foxx’s office.226 To reiterate, prosecutors make
cash bail requests and plea deal offers, but judges make cash bail decisions and sentencing
decisions. In Philadelphia, judges have rejected plea bargain agreements made by Krasner’s
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office because they believed the sentences were too light.227 While it may appear that
collaborating with judges on reforms would violate the independent status of the judiciary,
partnerships with judges are possible, and crucial.
D. State and local officials
State legislators and governors are the fourth external pressure that skeptics contend
constrain the ideal. State legislators write the criminal statutes that county prosecutors enforce.228
Additionally, the state legislature sets the county prosecutor’s budget.229 Legislators can push
back against prosecutors who don’t enforce their laws. The state legislature might reduce the
DA’s budget or give police officers the leeway to bring cases to a different DA’s office.230
Governors can also resist progressive prosecution. Orlando provides an example. The state
attorney general stated that district attorney Aramis Ayala had to consider the death penalty when
appropriate. The governor went on to reassign dozens of murder cases from Ayala’s office to a
different prosecutor.231 In short, scholars posit that state and local officials have tools to restrict
the progressive ideal through budget changes, political attacks, or legislation curbing the local
prosecutor’s authority. The police, judges, and legislators pose a menacing threat to the
progressive ideal, but I still have not covered perhaps the most pressing danger, the citizens.
E. Voters
Skeptics say the district attorney office’s electoral basis operates as a major constraint to
the progressive prosecutor ideal.232 The elected prosecutor’s reliance on citizen support presents
several challenges: the citizens who turn out in district attorney elections tend to be more
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privileged, on average, than the citizens who stay home.233 Further, one case gone bad can affect
a prosecutor’s ability to win re-election, even if the reform program as a whole is successful.234
As I will explain, this is referred to as the “Willie Horton problem.” Also, stereotyping
influences voters’ attitudes toward criminal justice. 235 Moreover, scholars say that while national
public opinion has shifted against mass incarceration for the time being, that could change if
crime rises.236 The first two issues, the “privileged voter” phenomenon, and the “Willie Horton”
challenge (when one high-profile mistake dominates an election), are not unique to prosecutor
elections. But these issues pose a particular problem for elected prosecutors who strive for the
progressive ideal, not least because they work in tandem with both stereotyping and the specter
of rising crime.
Overprivileged and overrepresented suburban voters are segregated from underprivileged
and underrepresented urban voters.237 But it is the latter group that is over-incarcerated. Affluent
suburbanites are, generally speaking, less enthusiastic about reducing incarceration. And
prosecutors respond to their electorate. Hughes describes how most prosecutors frame their
campaigns: “Don’t worry, you’re safe with me. I’ll be your attack dog.”238
A high-profile crime often plays a pivotal role in prosecutor elections: scholars call this
phenomenon the “Willie Horton problem.”239 William Horton was a participant in a program
backed by the then Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis. The program involved releasing
individuals from incarceration for a short period of time. While 99% of program participants did
not commit a crime while out of prison, William Horton was an exception. That exception came
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back to haunt Dukakis when he ran for president. His opponent, George H. W. Bush, ran racist
campaign ads declaring that Dukakis would endanger the public. Pfaff says that this ad campaign
was just the tip of the iceberg for Dukakis. But he also says that elected officials, prosecutors in
particular, are scared. They are not only scared that a progressive reform might fail across the
board but that one single case gone bad could tank their political future.240
As Krasner has said, “I realize there is this hunt for an anecdote so powerful that it’ll
suggest that what we’re doing here is not working.”241 Krasner’s quote shows that elected
prosecutors often have the Willie Horton concern in the back of their mind. It does not help
matters that voters have little else to rely on when they evaluate elected prosecutors.242 After all,
prosecutors issue their discovery, cash-bail, and charging policies behind closed doors, and most
voters know little about what goes on behind those doors.
Stereotyping activates citizens’ punitive attitude toward crime overall, and not just in
high-profile cases. Scholars point out that the “criminalblackman” stereotype gives way to a
tough-on-crime attitude among many white citizens.243 There is a false perception among many
white people, grounded in a long history of Black incarceration and made up media images, that
Black people are dangerous and unworthy of sympathy.
However, many citizens of color also support tough-on-crime politics.244 In that way,
stereotypes are not the whole picture; there are also genuine concerns among citizens of all
socioeconomic backgrounds about violent crime. Nevertheless, stereotyping is an important
factor behind the electorate’s voracious appetite for tough-on-crime policies.
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Moreover, scholars say that progressive prosecutors may have benefitted from low crime
levels. Should crime go up, voters could turn on their progressive prosecutor and instead vote in
a more conventional prosecutor.245 Also, skeptics contend that the progressive prosecution
movement is unlikely to find success in politically conservative regions.246 In that way, the
degree to which citizen backlash emerges against progressive prosecution depends on the
political makeup of the district in general, and especially the criminal justice attitudes of citizens
in the district.247 While mass incarceration and criminal justice reform efforts are both bipartisan,
Republicans tend to be more skeptical about radical reforms. For example, very few members of
the progressive prosecutor cohort are Republicans or were elected in Republican districts.
Overall, the electoral basis of the district attorney’s office gives rise to several threats to
the progressive prosecutor ideal: There is the “privileged voter” phenomenon, the “Willie
Horton” problem, stereotyping, and the political necessity of keeping crime in check. On top of
these four worries, skeptics are concerned not just about whether the progressive prosecutor can
work over time, but whether progressive prosecutors can win elections in conservative districts.
The doomed ideal
Advocates of progressive prosecution have an ambitious ideal type for the progressive
prosecutor. They imagine a prosecutor that reduces incarceration, prosecutes the police, and
improves procedural fairness. But skeptics say there are obstacles that could make the ideal
impossible. Received office norms constrain efforts to bring down incarceration rates and
improve procedural fairness. Resistance from police officers limits all three tenets of the ideal.
Pushback from judges may undermine efforts at anti-carceral prosecution. Furthermore, state
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legislatures and governors can undermine the chief prosecutor through institutional maneuvers.
In the end, the voters determine the prosecutor’s fate. Doubters of progressive prosecution
believe these obstacles, assistant prosecutors, police officers, judges, state and local officials, and
voters, make it impossible for a prosecutor to reach the ideal. Pickerell, an advocate of
progressive prosecution, summarizes the skeptics’ position: “other actors in the criminal justice
system will inevitably clip the wings of any reformist prosecutors’ agenda.” 248 As she points out
of the skeptics’ stance, “Even if a genuinely progressive prosecutor could overcome the
machinations of other actors,” the movement’s success is still “confined to only certain pockets
of the country.”249
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IV.

MOVING THE BARRIERS

In this section, I discuss the strategies emphasized by proponents for softening the
barriers to the progressive ideal. Advocates of the progressive prosecutor project assert that
retraining and replacing junior prosecutors, coordinating and collaborating with the police force,
adjusting charging practices, and forming a strong political message will soften pushback from
junior prosecutors, the police force, judges, state and local officials, and the electorate. My
central argument in this section is that advocates believe that these strategies will put the
progressive ideal within reach. A synthesis of both the obstacles to the progressive ideal and the
strategies for moving those obstacles can be found under Table 2.
A. Addressing office norms
Proponents of progressive prosecution believe the ideal can be reached despite the
barriers. For a progressive prosecutor to succeed, legal scholars say they will need to ensure that
her subordinates support her mandate.250 The win-at-all-costs culture in DA’s offices flows from
the internal incentive structure.251 Prosecutors in many offices are promoted based on their
conviction rates and the lengths of the sentences that they secure.252 As a result, the prosecutors
adopt a harsh mindset. Advocates of progressive prosecution contend the best way to counter the
win-at-all costs mentality is to set different expectations for the staff. It will require creativity to
come up with a new incentive structure. Professor David Alan Slansky, for example, suggests
judging line attorneys on “how scrupulous they are in honoring constitutional rights, how
thoughtful they are in crafting fair plea bargains, and how measured they are in exercising their
discretion.”253 The Brennan Center for Justice, suggests metrics on “... reducing incarceration,
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pretrial detention, and recidivism.”254 Proponents believe that the best incentive structure will
reward line prosecutors for bringing down incarceration and achieving procedural fairness.
In addition to changing the incentives, the chief prosecutor has other tools for reforming
the culture in her office. One tool is training programs that aim to make assistant prosecutors
more mindful of progressive ideals. Required courses on implicit bias, racial disparities, and
poverty are a start.255 But incentives and training, while important, are not enough to win
everyone over. Some progressive prosecutors, including Larry Krasner, Beth McCann, and
Wesley Bell have fired uncooperative line attorneys.256 It is harsh to let go of career prosecutors,
but scholars agree that it is necessary.257 There will be some prosecutors who are too committed
to the old model. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that while in some districts, junior
prosecutors are “at will” employees, in unionized prosecutor offices, for instance, mass firings
are not possible. In addition to mass firings, the chief prosecutor would be well-served to reform
hiring practices. It is advisable to hire a staff that is both diverse and committed to reform.258
Proponents assert the best response to received office norms is changing the incentive structure,
introducing new training programs, firing stubborn subordinates, and hiring diverse,
progressive-minded replacements.
B. Addressing police pressure
Progressive prosecutors also face a hostile external environment. Advocates of
progressive prosecution say that dealing with police pressure requires walking a fine line
between working with the police and standing up to police.259 The police force is independent
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from the DA’s office.260 And as a result, the prosecutor’s office cannot make the police
department change their arresting and investigation practices. Progressive DAs instead have to
communicate and collaborate to mitigate police resistance.261 A prosecutor should tell the police
commissioner about the crimes that their office will no longer charge.262 If the police chief
disagrees with the change, the prosecutor may need to convince them, or compromise.263 Angela
J. Davis says that it is important that the DA not surprise the police department. She also says
that a second strategy for improving the relationship with the police department is to work with
them on reform programs. For instance, she says that progressive prosecutor Dan Satterberg of
Seattle, Washington, elected in 2007, founded a program called Law Enforcement Assisted
Diversion (LEAD). Under LEAD, police officers allowed people who committed certain
low-level crimes to enter treatment rather than face criminal charges.264
Nonetheless, police prosecution advocates say prosecutors must stand up to the police
force. Traditional prosecutors have a political stake in securing an endorsement from the police
union.265 Many progressive prosecutors, on the other hand, were elected on a promise to root out
police corruption.266 With the exception of the city council, the prosecutor’s office is the best
agency for tackling police misconduct.267 Progressive prosecutors should carry forward on
challenging police brutality, perjury, and illegal searches.268 They are able to do so because they
are an independent agency and have no political debts to the police union.269 In contrast, police
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unions generally endorse prosecutors who run tough-on-crime campaigns. In sum, advocates
assert a progressive DA should work with the police to the extent that doing so will reduce
incarceration but also serve as a check on their power.
C. Addressing judicial pressure
While advocates of progressive prosecution have responded to the office norm threat, the
police resistance threat (the two barriers that receive the most emphasis from skeptics), they put
less emphasis on the issue of dealing with judicial resistance. Still, Pfaff has discussed this
barrier. He says prosecutors have significant influence on the outcome of a criminal proceeding.
The prosecutor’s decision about what charges to file and how many charges to file restricts the
judge’s authority.270 When a prosecutor selects charges that carry a lower sentence, the judge will
have to impose a sentence that falls within the guidelines for that offense. For Pfaff, a
progressive chief prosecutor might exercise that authority to secure lower sentences. At the same
time, Pfaff acknowledges that judges present a barrier in reducing cash bail requests.
D. Addressing elected officials and the electorate
There are many political barriers to the progressive prosecutor ideal: Privileged citizens
vote in higher numbers than underprivileged citizens, stereotyping depresses white support for
progressive criminal justice reforms, many disadvantaged citizens also have a punitive stance
toward criminal justice, one high-profile crime or rising crime rates can sink a prosecutor’s
re-election bid, and it appears that prosecutors cannot get elected in the first place in Republican
districts on a progressive platform. How, then, do advocates of progressive prosecution respond?
Advocates often frame the electoral basis of the district attorney’s office as an
opportunity, rather than a challenge. For example, proponents point to the ACLU’s 2017 national
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poll of 1600 registered voters about prosecution.271 The ACLU poll found that 83% of
Republicans, 94% of Democrats, and 92% of Independents said it was “important” or “very
important” for their elected prosecutor to use prison alternatives to reduce incarceration.
Moreover, 90% of white voters, 90% of Latinx voters, and 95% of Black voters said it was
“important” or “very important” for their prosecutor to reduce racially biased treatment in the
criminal justice system, 85% of voters said they are “much more likely” to back a prosecutor
who advances data transparency, and 79% of voters said they are “much more likely” to back a
prosecutor who sees it as their duty to prosecute police crimes.272 According to the ACLU poll,
then, the three key goals of the progressive prosecution movement have broad-based, bipartisan,
and multiracial support.
Still, the response from the advocates is more nuanced than the suggestion that voters
support progressive prosecution. For example, Pfaff points to a 2016 Vox poll with a sample size
of 3,000, which found that 55% of liberals, 62% of moderates, and 68% of conservatives oppose
reducing incarceration for violent offenses, even if there is a low probability that the offender
commits another crime.273 The poll also says that over half of the respondents believed that 50%
of the prison population is serving time for drug crimes, even though the reality is that 15% of
the prison population is serving time for a drug crime. Pfaff highlights the Vox poll to show that
many voters think they support reducing incarceration because they overestimate the number of
individuals confined for low-level drug crimes.274 This misconception is an issue because
reducing incarceration for low-level drug offenders will not be enough to fully overturn the
system of mass incarceration.
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In turn, progressive prosecutors should harness the existing support behind reducing
incarceration for low-level offenses. At the same time, elected prosecutors should build on that
energy to bring support for reducing incarceration for violent offenses in the long-run.275
Harnessing existing support may entail, for instance, rhetorical appeals to either the fiscal costs
or the racial injustices of incarcerating low-level drug offenders.276 The former approach may be
especially effective in Republican areas,277 and the latter approach in Democratic areas.
The second step, building on that momentum, is tricky.278 Namely, because voters, in
general, do not support reducing incarceration for violent offenders right now.279 In turn, elected
prosecutors need to form a strong political message that challenges the dominant notion that
incarceration is a good approach for reducing violent crime. That is, elected prosecutors should
slowly push the conversation in a new direction: As Smith says, “This [building a
counter-message] is the way to beat back the prevailing narrative of incarceration as the answer
to every social problem.”280 It is not clear yet how prosecutors can build that narrative, but they
might work with movement groups to find a message that works, at least in the short-run.
Elected prosecutors should also promote the long-term goals of the movement by slowly
building a new kind of politics under which poverty and socioeconomic disparity are understood
as best addressed by way of expanding the welfare state, rather than the carceral state. To be
sure, balancing short-term political needs with the long-term goal of changing how people view
crime and punishment is easier said than done. The principal long-term rhetorical challenge is
that the fiscal costs and racial injustice framings may lose their appeal when the appeals for
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mercy are connected to violent offenders.281 In turn, there is uncertainty about what the best
counter-narrative would look like, but it is essential that elected prosecutors think about how to
move the conversation forward.
Even drawing on existing opposition to mass incarceration will help keep the progressive
ideal within reach. In addition, opening up data will help address the “Wille Horton” problem282
and staying connected to community groups will allow the prosecutor to energize their base
come re-election.283 Moreover, the ACLU is mounting a public education campaign that stresses
the importance of district attorneys.284 This campaign will help raise voter participation among
citizens who support progressive prosecution. Finally, the response to the “privileged voter”
problem is that the progressive prosecutor project entails taking power back from the
overprivileged and giving it to “more-urban, more-minority voters.”285 That is, progressive
prosecutors are winning in urban counties where, unlike in state legislative elections,
comparatively socioeconomically disadvantaged voters makeup a greater share of the
electorate.286 All that is needed, then, is to mobilize these voters and recruit progressive
candidates. Building out the movement into conservative areas, on the other hand, demands
drawing on existing Republican support to reduce mass incarceration through either fiscal-based
or gun-rights based appeals, which I will elaborate on in my discussion of Melissa Nelson.
In that way, prosecutors need to build a strong political message that works in the
short-term, move toward an effective long-term narrative, stays connected to movement groups,
supports public education campaigns, and opens up their internal data. These measures will
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promote political support inside and outside liberal regions for progressive prosecution. This is a
lot to ask of one elected prosecutor. But the progressive prosecutor project is not just about the
progressive prosecutors; it is a team-effort that includes activists, donors, nonprofits, community
groups, and faith-based organizations. These groups can work in concert with the elected
prosecutor to build political strength.
Reaching the ideal
The ideal may be achievable because there are strategies for progressive to weaken the
internal and external pressures. They can reshape the internal incentive structure while retraining
and replacing line prosecutors to shift the office culture. To deal with police resistance, the
prosecutor will need to persuade the police department to accept their reforms while holding
them accountable at the same time. To deal with friction from elected judges and other elected
officials, the progressive prosecutor will need to work with movement groups to mobilize and
win over voters. A summary of both the barriers and core responses is below in Table 2: Barriers
and responses.
Table 2: Barriers and responses
Barriers

Moving the Barriers

Office culture.

Retrain, replace, and adjust incentives.

The police.

Coordinate reforms with the police department.

Elected judges.

Request lower sentences and charge fewer crimes.

State and local officials.

Mobilize progressive voters in these elections.

Voters.

Form a strong political message.

In the following sections, I review three case studies to determine how close a prosecutor
who ran on a progressive agenda can reach the ideal in light of the barriers and potential
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responses. In testing these cases, I use the metrics shown in Figure 2: Progressive prosecutor
ideal metrics, which was discussed in Part II of this thesis. I additionally keep in mind the
boundaries and the ways to move those barriers when I examine the cases. Table 2: Barriers and
Responses summarizes the boundaries and responses put forward by skeptics and advocates of
progressive prosecution, respectively.
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V.

JOHN CHISHOLM: MULTITERM PROSECUTOR
Background

In this section, I analyze whether and to what extent Milwaukee County prosecutor John
Chisholm has achieved the ideals of the progressive prosecutor project relative to his
predecessor, and in light of internal and external barriers. Since Chisholm is in his third term, his
tenure should provide supporting evidence for the skeptics. On the skeptics’ view, political
pressure demands that a prosecutor revert to the “win-at-all-costs” model of prosecution to win
re-election. It warrants emphasis that Chisholm has been in office for 14 years and has won
re-election three times. If the skeptics’ argument is right, that is, we should expect Chisholm to
fail at advancing the core aims of the progressive prosecutor project over his multiple terms in
office. Before launching into my discussion of Chisholm, I will discuss the work of Mike
McCann, his predecessor, to provide context on the environment of prosecution in Milwaukee.
McCann showed incremental progress toward procedural justice but not toward reducing
incarceration or prosecuting police abuse. McCann’s progress on the procedural justice plank and
lack of progress on the anti-carceral and carceral progressivism planks should be kept in mind as
we examine Chisholm’s record.
I proceed to argue that Chisholm, by contrast, has made progress toward increasing the
fairness of the criminal judicial process through open-data operations, and has also made
progress toward reducing incarceration by expanding treatment programs. I also assert that the
extent to which Chisholm has been able to push toward the anti-carceral and procedural justice
ideals is limited by the compromises that he has had to make. First, Chisholm has opted to
introduce treatment orders, rather than non-prosecution orders. Even if Chisholm wanted to
pursue non-prosecution, it would be an unwinnable battle because of the pushback that would
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ensue from the state legislature and the police force. Second, Chisholm has focused his reforms
on non-violent, rather than violent offenders. Theoretically, Chisholm could issue a
non-prosecution order for violent crimes. But that would cause problems with other actors. For
example, the Republican Wisconsin state legislature, which prohibits local prosecutors from
directing state resources to treatment for violent offenders, could cut all his diversion funding.
Moreover, the electorate could vote him out. Third, Chisholm has refrained from prosecuting
police abuse. These three compromises, diversion over non-prosecution, nonviolent over violent,
and not taking action on police abuse have allowed him to build the cooperation he needed from
the police force in order to develop his mental health court.
In order to evaluate Chisholm’s success in realizing the progressive ideal relative to his
predecessor, I will first provide background about the prosecutor who was in office prior to
Chisholm. McCann succeeded on the procedural justice plank and failed on both the carceral
progressivism and anti-carceral planks. In 2006, Michael McCann concluded his 38-year tenure
as the Milwaukee County district attorney and endorsed John Chisholm to take his place.287 The
first time Chisholm encountered McCann was in law school.288 McCann had come to deliver a
guest lecture, where he said that prosecutors have a special responsibility to achieve justice for
the whole community.289 McCann’s speech inspired Chisholm to become a prosecutor.290
McCann’s biggest progressive achievement occurred during his last year in office. Davis
says that McCann was one of only three prosecutors to participate in a study conducted by the
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Vera Institute of Justice.291 The Prosecution and Racial Justice Program (PRJ)292 required elected
prosecutors to open their internal data.293
McCann’s transparency to the foundation is a move toward the procedural justice plank
of the model progressive prosecutor. That is because fair process requires that prosecutors
administer the law impartially, or without regard for race, says Levin.294 On the other hand,
McCann was ineffective at prosecuting police abuse. For example, activists organized a protest
in McCann’s office during his third term.295 The year was 1982.296 A young man named Ernest
Lacey had recently died during a police arrest.297 According to observers, three officers pushed
Lacey to the ground and one of them placed their knee on him until he suffocated.298 Organizers
in a group called the Coalition for Justice for Ernie Lacey held a sit-in at McCann's office to
protest that McCann had not pressed charges against one of the officers and only pressed minor
charges against the other two.299 McCann has been criticized for a long record of not holding the
police responsible for their actions;300 he was “too close to the police.”301
McCann’s failure to prosecute the police violates the carceral progressivism plank of the
ideal progressive prosecutor model. To conclude the background on Chisholm’s predecessor,
McCann’s decision to allow researchers to measure racial disparities in his office marked a step
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toward the procedural tenet of the ideal progressive prosecutor. Conversely, McCann’s weak
record on police brutality violates the carceral progressivism principle.
Chisholm had originally joined McCann’s office when he graduated law school in 1994.
He started as a rookie prosecutor, handling about 100 cases a day. Within a few years, he was
promoted to supervisor of the gun crime division.302 When McCann retired in 2006, Chisholm
mounted a campaign for Milwaukee district attorney. Chisholm’s opponent in the Democratic
primary was a civil rights lawyer named Larraine McNamara-McGraw.303 In the primary,
McNamara-McGraw said that McCann’s office had a record of racial bias; she promised to
reduce discrimination, prevent unlawful convictions, and diversify the office.304 Chisholm, on the
other hand, found a middle ground between change and continuity.305 Since Chisholm’s
campaign was less progressive than his primary opponent’s campaign, it should be an even
greater surprise if his tenure undermines the skeptics’ stance that progressive prosecution is
impossible over time.
Police violence was a major issue in the election. Shortly before the primary, McCann
was unable to reach a conviction against police officers who committed a violent attack against a
Black man named Frank Jude Jr. 306 Chisholm, in finding the middle ground on prosecuting the
police, “threaded the anger on the streets.”307 That is, he did not criticize McCann's record on
police shooting investigations, but also said that he would upgrade the office’s approach.
Chisholm doubled the votes of McNamara-McGraw in the 2006 Democratic primary.308 In the
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general election, police accountability was also a key issue. Republican candidate Lew
Wasserman said he would change the office’s approach to investigating police crimes, while
Chisholm said he would improve the approach.309 It is not clear the specific measures that
Chisholm proposed for upgrading the office’s approach to police shooting investigation. The
details of his proposals, that is, have not been documented in the primary source evidence I have
reviewed. The reason for that could be that Chisholm did not elaborate on the policy specifics.
He went on to dispatch Wasserman with 83% of the vote in the November 2007 general
election.310
Chisholm’s campaign agenda also included promises to focus on violent crimes, reduce
prosecutions of low-level crimes, and increase community accountability.311 “This is not a soft on
crime approach, this is a smart on crime approach,” Chisholm said in a 2007 radio segment.312
Chisholm also said he would start a “public integrity unit.”313 That is, a team of prosecutors
focused on corruption from elected officials. Chisholm’s promise to bring down incarceration of
certain crimes is a nod toward anti-carceral prosecution, which refers to policies that reduce the
use of prisons, jail, or the death penalty, while his public integrity unit advances carceral
progressivism.314 In short, Chisholm’s agenda included commitments to anti-carceral prosecution
for low-level crimes and prosecuting politicians who break the law.
Davis, Bazelon, and Marie Gottschalk describe Chisholm as an early model for
progressive prosecution.315 These scholars praise Chisholm for building on McCann’s
309
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collaboration with the Vera Institute for Justice.316 In addition to Chisholm’s work with the Vera
Institute, Emily Bazelon praises Chisholm for his generous evidence disclosure policy.317
Chisholm gives the defense attorney full access to his evidence.318 Bazelon, Slansky, and Bellin
emphasize the importance of transparent evidence disclosure policy.319 Evidence disclosure refers
to the Supreme Court’s mandate that prosecutors provide “material exculpatory evidence” —
facts that are strongly damaging to the state’s case — to the defense.320 Prosecutors who follow
that rarely enforced mandate to the fullest extent make the criminal process fairer, scholars say.321
Taken together, Davis, Bazelon, and Gottschalk claim that Chisholm has made strides toward
fairer process and less prison time (procedural justice and anti-carceral prosecution).322 Heather
Pickerell, for her part, says Chisholm has been criticized for his record prosecuting the police
(carceral progressivism).323 She says that Chisholm did not file charges against the officers who
killed Dontre Hamilton.324
Milwaukee prosecutor Michael McCann allowed researchers to track data in his office,
which showed promise on the procedural fairness metric. Still, McCann failed to combat police
violence, which reflected weakness in the police prosecution facet of the ideal model. Chisohlm,
McCann’s predecessor, won on a middle of the road platform. Chisholm is regarded in the
literature as a model progressive prosecutor because he expanded on McCann’s procedural
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reforms and introduced anti-carceral reforms. Critics of Chisholm, on the other hand, say he
failed to prosecute the police effectively.
In this section, I evaluate Chisolm’s progressive prosecutor credentials against Levin’s
three-planked model, relative to McCann. Chisholm, compared to McCann and traditional
prosecutors more generally, has made progress toward procedural justice through open-data
programs and open-evidence disclosure, as well as progress toward anti-carceral prosecution by
expanding treatment alternatives. At the same time, Chisholm’s tenure fails to show that
prosecutors have the capacity to take on police crimes. Nevertheless, he has shown that a
prosecutor can move toward less prison time and fairer process over a sustained period of time. I
conclude with the suggestion that progressive prosecutors outsource police investigations. My
central contention, though, is that Chisholm’s capacity to form relationships with more
conservative actors, especially the police force, pretrial services, elected judges, Wisconsin state
House and Senate legislators, and the electorate is the most crucial driver of his success. But at
the same time, Chisholm’s capacity to collaborate with relatively conservative actors prevents
him from prosecuting the police and limits the extent to which he can reduce incarceration time
and increase procedural fairness. Table 3: Progress toward the ideal summarizes a key reform,
key collaborators, key consequence, and key concessions of Chisholm’s tenure. Table 3 also
provides this information for my second and third case studies, which I discuss in Part VI and
Part VII.
As I will show, even if Chisholm wanted to issue a non-prosecution order, he would face
immense pushback from state legislators and police officers, who could keep making arrests for
those crimes. Even if Chisholm wanted to divert violent offenders, statutory restrictions from the
state legislature and political pressure from the public would undercut his ability to do so.
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Finally, Chisholm needs participation and agreement from the police department to implement
his diversion programs, which constrains him from taking an aggressive approach toward police
crimes. To be clear, Chisholm could refuse to compromise and issue a non-prosecution order
without the immediate approval of the police force, the state legislature, pretrial services,
probation officers, judges, or the electorate. But judges, police officers, other court actors, and
legislators could withdraw their cooperation or resist his diversion programs; the police force
could continue to make arrests over his non-prosecution order, judges could withdraw from
Chisholm’s problem-solving courts, and voters could oust him. Collaboration with more
conservative actors, then, is integral for sustainable change, but also places limits on how far a
progresive prosecutor can go.
A. Procedural justice
During his time in office, John Chisholm has made significant advancements toward
ensuring fair process, the first pillar of the progressive ideal. Chisholm has done so by way of
speeding up the review of police reports,325 providing all evidence to the defense,326 and
compiling data on racial disparities in charging and other decision points.327 These policies aim
to “improve the quality of justice,” as an interview participant with direct knowledge of
prosecution in Milwaukee put it.328 Chisholm’s record of tracking and addressing internal racial
disparities has received the most attention.329 Scholars and observers place particular emphasis
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on his work with the Vera Institute for Justice to address racial imbalances in prosecutions.330 I
will discuss the Vera project, but also Chisholm’s work with MacArthur Foundation researchers
and Fair and Just Prosecution.
When Chisholm ran for office in 2006, he stressed that he would build trust in his
community.331 Chisholm followed through by building on the work of Michael McCann, his
predecessor. In 2005, McCann allowed researchers from the Vera Institute for Justice to track his
office’s internal data.332 McCann was one of just two prosecutors to partake in the study.
Charlotte, North Carolina’s chief prosecutor Peter Gilchrist was the only other participant.333 As I
learned from an interview subject with direct knowledge of prosecution in Milwaukee, “Nobody
wanted to do that back then. Let an outsider see your data — see if [you’re] charging people
evenhandedly.”334
Chisholm, unlike Gilchrist’s successor, continued the partnership with Vera when he took
office in 2007. The Vera Institute, as part of their Prosecution and Racial Justice program,
studied whether there were unwarranted racial imbalances in the Milwauke County Proscutor
office’s handling of crime categories including drug paraphernalia possession, domestic violence,
resisting an officer, and prostitution.335 The researchers studied, for example, whether an assistant
Milwaukee prosecutor was more likely to charge a Black defendant for drug paraphernalia
possession than a white defendant. The Vera researchers found that there were gaping unjustified
racial disparities in the prosecution of drug paraphernalia cases and interracial domestic violence
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cases: the declination rate for a drug paraphernalia case was 41% for white defendants, compared
to 27% for Black defendants.336 Additionally, there was a 34% higher likelihood of prosecution
for domestic violence cases involving a Black offender and a white victim, as compared to
domestic violence cases involving a white offender and a white victim.337
Chisholm held conferences with police officers, anti-domestic violence advocacy groups,
probation officers, and his staff to formulate a plan for solving the disparities in interracial
domestic violence cases, according to Davis.338 In an interview, I learned that Chisholm also
conferred with pretrial service employees.339 These meetings support my argument that
collaboration with more conservative actors has been a major component of Chisholm’s strategy
for the successful introduction of procedural justice. In addition, Chisholm held town halls where
he asked his constituents for their advice about how to close the racial disparities.340
He then proceeded to establish a series of training programs in 2012 that aimed to reduce
racial discrimination in these cases.341 In addition, Chisholm introduced policies to reduce
incarceration for drug paraphernalia possession and domestic violence.342 I will elaborate on
those policies in the anti-carceral prosecution subsection. But the key takeaway is that
Chisholm’s lauded Vera project involved collaborating with Vera researchers, junior prosecutors,
police officers, parole officers, pretrial services, and the community in order to build a robust
coalition behind a campaign to identify and address racial disparities. Building that coalition has
entailed a progressive, but cautious model of procedural justice. As an interview participant who
has direct familiarity with the Milwaukee County criminal justice system said to me,
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“[Chisholm’s] approach has been a bit longer-term and based on collaboration, measuring the
results, and making sure it’s having the impact that we want.”343
Chisholm later voluntarily published the results of the Vera Project to the public.344 Davis
has described his involvement in the Vera Institute for Justice’s Prosecution and Racial Justice
Program, “the most successful and long-standing model of the program to date.”345 His work
with the Vera Institute for Justice continued until at least 2013.346
One part of the Vera study involved interviews with junior prosecutors about their
motivations. Importantly, McWithey stresses the importance of identifying the motivations of
junior prosecutors.347 Chisholm discovered that some of his junior prosecutors see their role as
doing justice for victims and safeguarding the community. Chisholm’s response to that finding is
not to fire those junior prosecutors. “You gotta nurture that,” an interview subject with direct
involvement with Chisholm’s office told me of his perspective. But at the same time, Chisholm
will often move his victim-focused prosecutors to diversion units or to his community
prosecution program in order to give them a more nuanced sense of how to achieve justice for
the community.348
The Vera study was followed by similar efforts. “Once you’re in that cycle — you start to
get on a roll with it,” an interview subject who has close familiarity with the Milwaukee criminal
justice system told me.349 For example, Chisholm later allowed experts at Loyola University and
Florida International University (FIU), funded by the MacArthur Foundation, to conduct an

Phone call with interview subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author).
Davis, “Racial Justice,” 847.
345
Davis, “Racial Justice,” 839.
346
Davis, “Racial Justice,” 839.
347
McWithey, “Internal Constraints,” 35.
348
Phone call with interview subject (February 5, 2021).
349
Phone call with interview subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author).
343
344

65

expansive study of his office’s practices.350 The MacArthur researchers also studied the following
prosecutor offices: Melissa Nelson of Jacksonville, Florida, Kim Foxx of Cook County, Illinois
and Andrew Warren of Tampa, Florida. 351
The MacArthur experts analyzed 60,000 cases from 2017 and 2018 in Chisholm’s
office.352 They looked at issues including the charging decision (rate at which the office accepted
a case from the police department), the charge selection decision (the specific charges that the
office brought for every given case), and sentence requests (the length of the sentence that the
office asked of the judge for every case).353 For each of these decisions, the researchers examined
whether there were unexplained racial disparities. The joint Loyola-Florida research project of
Chisholm’s office was later published into a 62 page report, available to the public.354
In addition to the Vera and MacArthur studies, Chisholm worked with Branden DuPont, a
data analyst and Don Stemen, a criminal justice professor to build a “community dashboard.”355
That is, a database with public statistics on alternatives to incarceration over time, the rate at
which the office dismisses cases over time, speed at which the office connects with victims over
time, and jail sentences over time.356 Chisholm worked with Fair and Just Prosecution, a
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nonprofit that helps reform-oriented prosecutors, to develop these metrics for effective
prosecution.357
The data on treatment alternatives and jail sentences goes back to 2015, while the data on
dismissals and victim contact goes to 2017.358 In addition to graphs showing change over time,
the database allows users to see the tables from which the graphs were created.359 Chisholm has
said there will be more data to come.360 For these three initiatives, the 2007 Vera project, the
2017-2017 MacArthur study, and the 2020 community dashboard, Chisholm has held meetings
with constituents, defense lawyers, police officers, pretrial services, nonprofits, activists, and
religious groups. In those meetings, he has updated these actors about the projects and discussed
the results.361 Building a coalition inside and outside the court system and across the ideological
spectrum has helped ensure the smooth rollout of Chisholm’s procedural justice reforms.
Success toward procedural justice is rare. Pfaff and Bazelon call prosecutor offices, “the
black box.”362 Prosecutors tend to keep their data and internal decisions close to their chest and
away from the public, in part, because they are legally allowed to do so, says Davis.363 Chisholm
has shown through the Vera project, the MacArthur study, and the public data dashboard project,
that a different approach is possible. Notably, Slansky and Ronald Wright have both called for
prosecutors to provide more data to the public.364 Slansky suggests that prosecutors allow
external groups to conduct the research to ensure it is not biased: “You should invite them in,” he
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says.365 In addition, Wright recommends that prosecutors engage with the community about the
data.366
Tracking and releasing data marks a step toward fairer process because an office can only
correct unfair procedure (e.g., discrimination) if it knows the points at which racial discrepancies
are occurring. Moreover, as prosecutor scholars point out, releasing data lets voters make
informed evaluations about their elected prosecutor, rather than place exclusive focus on
personality, experience, a high-profile crime, crime rates, a tough on crime posture, or conviction
rates.367 For that reason, Chisholm’s data-tracking supports my claim that he has made progress
toward increasing the fairness of the criminal judicial process, which is the first plank of
Levein’s three-planked ideal model. This is not to downplay Chisholm’s other progress toward
procedural justice, including his decision to increase the speed at which his office reviews police
reports and his decision to allow for open evidence disclosure to the defense. These other
policies also mark major progress toward the ideal, but open data initiatives exemplify
Chisohlm’s commitment to procedural justice.
Most crucially, Chisholm’s open-data projects entail meetings with the police force,
parole officers, domestic violence victims’ advocates, pretrial services, and the electorate. These
conservative agents are not the best ideological allies, but their support is needed to prevent
resistance against progressive prosecution.
B. Carceral progressivism
Chisholm has been less successful on the carceral progressivism plank, compared to his
meaningful progress toward fair process. Carceral progressivism is the view that the penal
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system should focus on lawbreaking police officers, politicians, landlords, wealthy people, and
corporations.368 The progressive ideal demands the prosecutor hold powerful offenders to
account. Incidents of police brutality have played a significant role in activating mass
engagement in district attorney elections; as I mention in the progressive prosecutor ideal
section, my carceral progressivism assessment focuses on prosecuting wrongful police behavior.
Chisholm has shown weakness in that area: Critics claim he has been unsuccessful at prosecuting
police crimes.369 While my research shows that to be true, I have also found that Chisholm has
been willing to engage with constituents about the decisions he makes in police shootings.
Pickerell criticizes Chisholm’s decision to not pursue a criminal case against the police
officer who shot Dontre Hamilton.370 Hamilton was a 31-year old Black man who worked at
Starbucks.371 He was resting on a park bench in Milwaukee, unarmed, before he was woken up
and shot 14 times by a Milwaukee police officer.372 The police killing of Dontre Hamilton on
April 30th, 2014 prompted mass protests in Milwaukee: at those protests, over 70 people were
arrested and a major highway was shut down, according to local Milwaukee reporter Adam
Rogan.373 Moreover, the death of Hamilton motivated his brother to form the Coalition for
Justice, which advanced a set of modest demands for police reform.374 The blowback led to the
Milwaukee Police Department’s introduction of body cameras, according to Rogan.375 Chisholm

Levin, “Imagining.”
Pickerell, “Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor,” 40.
370
Pickerell, “Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor” 40.
371
Adam Rogan, “4 Years Later: Dontre Hamilton and Dontre Day,” Milwaukee Magazine, May 4, 2018.
372
Rogan, “4 Years Later.”
373
Rogan, “4 Years Later.”
374
Rogan, “4 Years Later;” “Coalition for Justice,” Justicefordontre, Facebook,
https://www.facebook.com/justicefordontre/about/?ref=page_internal.
375
Rogan, “4 Years Later.”
368
369

69

said his office found the shooting was in self-defense, but the Wisconsin ACLU, in addition to
Pickerell, criticized Chisholm for not filing charges.376
Moreover, there has been extensive news coverage about Chisholm’s decision in October
2020 to not bring charges against Joseph Mensah, the police officer who killed Alvin Cole, a
17-year old Black man.377 Mensah had killed two people during his time as a police officer for
the city of Wauwatosa before he shot Cole on February 2nd, 2020.378 As a result of the February
incident, Mensah stepped down from his post.379 But in January 2021, Mensah was hired as a
deputy for the Waukesha County, Wisconsin sheriff’s office.380 Mensah’s killing of Alvin Cole
generated protests close to the mall in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin where Cole died.381 “I do not
believe that the State could disprove self-defense or defense of others in this case…” Chisholm
said.382 Chisholm also said that Cole was armed with a gun.383 The police force said that Cole
shot at the officers, but members of Cole’s family, as well as their lawyers, contested that
claim.384
As prosecutor scholars point out, we should be cautious about placing too much weight
on individual cases, in lieu of a holistic analysis.385 There is disagreement in the literature about
Tom Swigert, “Chisholm: Use of force against Dontre Hamilton was self-defense,” On Milwaukee,
December 22, 2014.
377
Evan Casey and Eddie Morales, “Milwaukee County district attorney will not charge Police Officer
Joseph Mensah in shooting death of Alvin Cole,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 7, 2020; Ashley
Luther, “Officers are rarely charged with shootings in Milwaukee County. It’s even rarer for them to be
convicted,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 7, 2020; “Former Wisconsin officer cleared in 3
shootings now a deputy,” AP News, January 26, 2021; Aaron Maybin, Kasey Chronis and Katie DeLong,
“DA: No charges against Officer Mensah in shooting of Alvin Cole,” Fox 6 Milwaukee, October 7, 2020;
Marisa Wojcik, “Wauwatosa Officer Free of Charges,” PBS Wisconsin, October 9, 2021.
378
Wojcik, “Officer Free of Charges.”
379
“Former Wisconsin Officer”; Bill Chappell, “Officer Who Quit Wisconsin Police Job Under Pressure
Joins Nearby Sheriff's Dept.,” NPR, WAMU 88.5, January 28, 2021.
380
Chappell, “Officer Who Quit.”
381
“Charging decision expected in fatal police shooting of teen,” AP News, October 6, 2020.
382
Casey and Morales, “Milwaukee County district attorney.”
383
Maybin et al., “DA: no charges.”
384
“Charging decision expected.”
385
Slansky, “Changing Political Landscape;” Pfaff, Locked In.
376

70

the best way to investigate and prosecute police crimes. Some scholars believe the prosecutor
should investigate and prosecute alleged police crimes “on their own turf.”386 The second option
is to have the investigation and prosecution handled by a nearby office, a special team, or a
higher level criminal official, such as the state attorney general.387 In Chisholm’s office, outside
officials conduct the investigation, while Chisholm makes the charging decision.
Police shootings in Milwaukee have been investigated primarily by the Milwaukee Area
Investigative Team (MAIT) since 2016.388 The Milwaukee Area Investigative Team includes
various law enforcement officials from nearby counties. The local team conducts the
investigations, and then Chisholm determines whether or not to bring charges.389 In one police
shooting, members of MAIT provided consistent updates to the police department in which the
officer who was being investigated worked, according to Isiah Holmes, a journalist for Urban
Milwaukee.390 The police department and the investigators even discussed how to handle the
media firestorm that would ensue following the announcement of the investigation’s conclusions,
says Holmes.391
Even with these concerns in mind, it is difficult to make a definitive conclusion about
Chisholm’s success in holding officers to account. Still, interview participants I have spoken to
have made hints that he has struggled in that area. There were “a number of incidents,” I learned,
“where people were upset.”392 I also learned from interview participants that Chisholm has
always made himself available to activists and constituents who disagree with his decision in any
McWithey, “External Constraints,” 53.
Slansky, “Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook,” 39; Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 17.
388
Isiah Holmes, “How Independent Are Police Shooting Investigations?” Urban Milwaukee, December
5, 2020.
389
Holmes, “How Independent.”
390
Holmes, “How Independent.”
391
Holmes, “How Independent.”
392
Zoom call with interview subject (February 3, 2021) (on file with author).
386
387

71

given police case.393 My review of secondary sources confirms that Chisholm has been
transparent when it comes to police investigations.394 One interview subject with direct
knowledge of activism in Milwaukee County told me that while there is often contention over his
decisions, even frustrated constituents respect Chisholm because “he’ll always take the call.”395
That is, Chisholm makes himself available to constituents, including those who disagree with
him.
Although he takes the call, Chisholm’s decision to not prosecute the officers responsible
for the deaths of Hamilton and Cole crossed the line in the sand set by movement groups who
protested these abuses of police power. It should be noted, though, that a failure to hold police
officers to account is not unique to Milwaukee County. Prosecutors bring charges in fewer than
two percent of police killings, even though the police kill 1,000 people a year.396 To be sure, the
challenges of prosecuting the police cannot be overstated. For one, the laws that govern police
behavior are more pro-defendant than the laws that govern citizens, according to the lawyer for a
family of a man killed by the police in Milwaukee.397 Second, the police force and the
prosecutor’s office are connected to each other. “You can’t just have a purely adversarial
relationship with law enforcement. In fact, you have to engage with them with the goal of
making sure that they do things right,” an interview subject with direct knowledge of Chisholm
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said about his stance.398 Notwithstanding these challenges, scholars stress that prosecutors have
the agency to investigate and prosecute police killings.399
The evidence I have presented supports Pickerell’s assertion that Chisholm has had
“mixed” results when it comes to holding police officers responsible.400 His transparency should
be praised, but Chisholm should take steps to improve his approach to the investigation and
prosecution of police crimes. He could ensure, for instance, that there is not an appearance of a
conflict of interest with the investigative team, as Slansky suggests.401 Moreover, since Chisholm
has been hesitant to file charges against officers who have committed wrongdoings, he could
consider deferring the charging responsibility to Josh Kaul, the Wisconsin state attorney
general.402
Overall, though, I argue that Chisholm’s decision to not prosecute certain instances of
egregious police abuse was a necessary step for developing the rapport with the police force that
he needed for police cooperation on his diversion programs, including a drug court, a mental
health court, a domestic violence court, and a veteran’s court. To be clear, it is possible that had
Chisholm taken on major police shootings, he could still have maintained police cooperation.
But given what we know about police unions and police commissioners, it is reasonable to think
that if Chisholm took an aggressive tack toward police misconduct, he would lose police
cooperation. This claim will be further supported in my discussions of my second two case
studies, Nelson and Chisholm.
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C. Anti-carceral prosecution
Figure 3: Milwaukee County incarceration rates403

In contrast to his difficulties surrounding police accountability, Chisholm has shown
promise on the anti-carceral prosecution plank of the ideal model. Figure 3 shows the jail
admissions rate over time in Milwaukee County with a dashed line for when Chisholm took
office. As the graph shows, Chisholm has brought the jail population in Milwaukee County.404
He has done so by working with judges, defense lawyers, police officers and other criminal legal
officials to roll out a range of alternatives to prison and jail over his multiple terms in office.405
Those alternatives include a drug court, treatment for certain low-level domestic violence
offenders, and treatment for veterans with PTSD.406 In addition, Chisholm has piloted a mental

Coding assistance from Clare Stevens, Oberlin College ‘21; Data from “Pretrial jail incarceration
rates,” Vera Institute for Justice, accessed March 23, 2021,
https://trends.vera.org/incarceration-rates?data=pretrial.
404
Green et al., “Good Prosecutor in 2018,” 11; Green and Roiphe, “When Prosecutors Politick,” 17-18;
Bazelon, Charged, 80; Gottschalk, Caught, 266.
405
Phone call with interview subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author); Zoom call with interview
subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author).
406
Phone call with interview subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author); Zoom call with interview
subject (February 5, 2021) (on file with author).
403

74

health court.407 All of these policies are known as “diversion programs.” In other words, a
defendant can avoid criminal prosecution so long as they partake in a designated treatment
program and fulfill the other conditions of the agreement, which might, for instance, include
drug tests for a period for time.
In 2009, Chisholm worked with judges, public defenders, and a range of other parties to
form the Milwaukee County Drug Treatment Court.408 “Drug courts were common in other
places. But they were radical in Milwaukee,” I learned in an interview.409 Chisholm helped
develop this program because he saw from the data, and from his time as a prosecutor, wide
racial imbalances in incarceration for low-level drug offenses.410 People who committed a
low-level drug crime and meet certain criteria are given the opportunity to enter the drug court.
There, they are often required to complete a one year program that includes drug treatment,
therapy, and increased treatment after a relapse.411
Most diversion programs work in a similar way: if the individual completes the treatment
relevant to the offense and the other conditions of the agreement, they get to avoid jail. In
criminal legal circles, diversion programs are often called the “carrot and stick” approach.412
Under McCann, by contrast, there was no carrot. During the 1980s and 1990s crack epidemic in
particular, the office had an exclusive focus on securing incarceration for drug crimes.413
Chisholm, a military veteran, has partnered with groups to develop additional diversion
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programs. Since 2010, for instance, his office has worked with Dryhootch, a Milwaukee-based
support network for military veterans as well as the Medical College of Wisconsin to provide
treatment instead of prison or jail for veterans with post traumatic stress disorder who commit
certain low-level crimes.414
In addition, Chisholm’s office started an initiative in 2013 with the Sojourner Family
Peace Center, a Milwaukee nonprofit that helps domestic violence victims, to provide treatment
alternatives for certain domestic low-level violence offenders.415 Chisholm obtained $10 million
in grant funding from the Republican governor to institute this domestic violence diversion
program.416 Notably, the program was influenced in large part by domestic violence advocates in
Milwaukee, who wanted to reduce reoffense rates in domestic violence cases.417 Chisholm’s
Domestic Violence Diversion Court, like all his diversion programs, entails collaboration from
the judges, the police force, and his staff.
Furthermore, Chisholm’s office received $2 million in grant funding from the MacArthur
Foundation to develop a mental health court in 2016.418 Chisholm started this program through
his work on the Milwaukee Community Justice Council, which includes judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, correctional officers, psychologists, and other actors.419 The mental health court
allows individuals suffering from mental health issues who commit non-serious crimes to receive
treatment rather than be placed in a cell.420 Importantly, the program is designed to ensure that
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people who qualify for the program are not placed in jail after their arrest.421 Chisholm has said
the program is still in its early stages.422 In the future, he has said that the mental health court
may also allow for incarceration alternatives for people who do not have mental health issues
and commit non-serious crimes.423
Chisholm’s anti-carceral reforms have included incarceration alternatives for low-level
drug offenses, low-level domestic violence crimes, low-level crimes committed by soldiers with
PTSD, low-level juvenile crimes, and low-level crimes committed by people with mental health
issues. His drug court, domestic violence alternatives, military veteran alternatives, and mental
health court have all involved working with people in and outside the criminal legal system. It
appears that Chisholm’s early data collection efforts influenced his anti-carceral policies. For
example, the Vera project studied disparities in low-level drug crimes and domestic violence
crimes (drug court and domestic violence alternatives) and Chisholm continued to work with the
MacArthur foundation after their study of his office, through the development of the mental
health court.
Chisholm has made significant progress toward reducing incarceration. My review of
primary and secondary sources confirms the claim in the literature that Chishom has brought
down the jail population,424 and the data shows that to be true.425 Notably, all of Chisholm’s
programs apply exclusively to nonviolent offenders; “I have to keep my hand on the till, as it
were,” an interview subject with knowledge of Chisholm’s views told me of his practices toward
violent crimes.
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Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that Chisholm’s anti-carceral reforms are
largely “diversion programs.” Covert says diversion programs are disciplinary because they
involve supervision: for instance, diversions often demand completion of treatment and other
requirements to avoid prosecution.426 The author of the anonymous Harvard Law Review note
adds that diversion programs expand police funding, which is counterproductive to opposing
mass incarceration.427 Moreover, critics charge that prosecutors often funnel people into
diversion programs when they think they cannot reach a conviction.428 Finally, there is the
criticism that diversion programs are often funded from fees collected by defendants. 429 But
defense lawyers prefer diversion to incarceration.430 Moreover, these critiques may not apply to
Chisholm’s programs. The mental health court, for instance, is funded by a grant from the
MacArthur foundation, the domestic violence court was funded by a grant from the governor,
and the veteran program is handled by the nonprofit group Dryhootch.
Despite his progress with diversion, one area that Chisholm has avoided is
non-prosecution orders. That is, the order that prosecutors never prosecute certain crimes, no
matter what. For instance, Mosby’s office has rolled out a non-prosecution order for a range of
crimes during the pandemic.431 Chisholm’s approach is more incremental. An advantage to his
emphasis on diversion over non-prosecution is that diversion is more likely to bring police
officers and judges on board. Largely because diversion may be viewed as less of an overreach
than non-prosecution. Judges and police officers may view non-prosecution as nullifying a
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criminal law passed by the legislature. Conversely, diversion might be more politically palatable,
as the prosecutor can still claim that there is some form of accountability in place.432
Beyond Chisholm’s decisions to focus on nonviolent offenders and diversion programs
instead of violent offenders and non-prosecution, he has also made a rhetorical compromise:
Chisholm does not self-identify as a progressive prosecutor. According to an interview subject
with direct knowledge about Chisohlm, he believes it is a “term that’s a little overbroad.”433
Moreover, Chisholm takes care to remind the community that he is not only reducing
unnecessary incarceration and racial disparities, but also “takes a tough stance on violent
crime.”434 Chisholm is not unique in this respect: Nearly every progressive prosecutor positions
themselves as tough on violent crime and “smart” or “reform-minded” on nonviolent crime. But
it is important to keep in mind that stressing a tough posture toward violent crime is a rhetorical
concession to the tough-on-crime model.
In short, Chisholm has made progress toward reducing incarceration by way of
developing diversion programs for low-level drug crimes, domestic violence crimes, crimes
committed by veterans with PTSD, and crimes committed by individuals with mental health
issues. He has not, however, issued a non-prosecution order, reformed his approach to
prosecuting violent crime, nor prosecuted instances of egregious police abuse. Moreover,
Chisholm is rhetorically tough on violent crime. But those concessions may have been wise, as
they have allowed him to develop the cooperation with the police, judges, legislators, and the
electorate that he needed to introduce a range of diversion programs that have brought down the
incarcerated population. Chisholm’s 2009 drug diversion program, 2010 veteran diversion
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program, 2013 domestic violence diversion program, and 2016 mental health diversion initiative
were made possible through partnerships with the police force and judges. And yet these
programs contradict the critics’ claim that prosecutors cannot possibly bring down the
incarceration rate over a sustained period of time in light of pressure from the police, judges,
legislators, state and local officials, and the electorate. Chisholm has shown it is possible to
develop the cooperation and support from these relatively conservative actors needed to adjust to
those barriers over the long-term. The same strategy applies to his procedural justice reforms.
Chisholm has obtained cooperation from junior prosecutors to implement these programs. In the
process, he has nurtured a tough-on-crime spirit, while also working incrementally toward
shifting junior prosecutors’ attitudes more in line with a progressive-oriented vision. Making
compromises to build cooperation has supported Chisholm’s capacity to introduce a remarkable
set of open-data projects that challenge the “black box” norm. Collaboration with more
conservative actors has required concessions, then, but has also proven instrumental to
Chisholm’s progress toward reducing incarceration and increasing transparency.
The compromises prosecutors must to succeed over time
The evidence I have compiled confirms the claims of Davis, Gottschalk, and Bazelon that
Chisholm presents a model for improving the fairness of the criminal process while reducing
incarceration at the same time. In the preceding discussion I drew attention to Chisholm’s
openness with his data, exemplified through his work with the Vera Institute, the MacArthur
Foundation, and Fair and Just Prosecution. I also highlighted Chisholm’s treatment alternatives
for low-level drug offenders, domestic violence offenders, and veterans with PTSD. These
efforts are significant. Opening data to the public shows the “black box” brand of prosecution is
not an inevitability. Second, expanding treatment alternatives represents a shift from the
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“lock-em-up and throw away the key” ethos that dominates prosecutor offices. Still, my findings
also affirm Pickerell’s claim that Chisholm has been less effective at holding police officers to
account. For example, I learned from interview research that many constituents feel frustrated by
Chisholm’s decisions in police shootings. In addition, secondary evidence raises questions about
the integrity of the investigative process in Milwaukee County for handling police shootings.
Chisholm’s success in introducing fairer process and reducing incarceration was made
possible in large part through relationship-building with some of the actors who are often most
resistant to progressive reforms, including the police force, judges, and junior prosecutors.
Chisholm could not have established the drug court, the domestic violence program, cognitive
behavioral therapy for veterans with PTSD, and the mental health court by himself. He needed
“buy-in,” as one interview participant put it.435 Take the Milwaukee County Drug Court, which
Chisholm established in 2009. Chisholm brought judges on board.436 He needed their approval to
get the program off the ground in no small part because a drug court requires judges to preside
over the proceedings.
From my interviews, I found that Chisholm established a good relationship with judges
early on. From his time as an assistant prosecutor for McCann, Chisholm made a good
impression on judges.437 He established himself as “... the epitome of the best and brightest —
tough, thoughtful, and brilliant.”438 Chisholm also helped the courts receive federal funding
through the Violence Against Women Act in 1994. 439 Chisholm has continued to work with
judges throughout his tenure. From one interview, I learned that Chisholm has helped multiple
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judges get elected.440 This is not to say that Chisholm has engaged in improper behavior by
helping judges get elected so they would support his reforms. Chisholm’s work on judicial
campaigns does show, however, that he has looked to help out his colleagues by supporting them
in their endeavors. By developing a good working relationship with judges, he may have helped
make them more receptive to his ideas.
To be sure, it also helped that Shirely Abrahamson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court justice
from 1976 to 2019, has been at the forefront of criminal legal reforms in Milwaukee.441 Justice
Abrahamson noted the racial disparities in drug sentences, and was interested in changing
Milwaukee’s approach to drug crimes. She went on to approve Chisholm’s formation of the drug
court.442 But that required working together, and it could not have hurt that Chisholm had a good
reputation among Circuit and District Court judges in Milwaukee.443
Chisholm has formed a strong relationship with other actors, too. Chisholm built support
with activists in the community before he ran for district attorney. As one interview participant
told me, “John was just in the group.”444 Moreover, Chisholm’s open data initiatives involved
collaboration with outside experts. His work on alternatives for veterans, too, involved working
with Dryhootch, the veteran support group in Milwaukee.
Chisholm’s success in reducing incarceration also required participation from the police
department. For example, the mental health court asks police officers to not jail individuals who
qualify for the program. In general, Chisholm’s treatment programs oblige police officers to take
a different approach than they do for most cases.445 Before introducing the diversion programs,
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Chisholm has told the police department what he planned to do and invited their input, I learned
in an interview.446 That approach connects with Davis’s advice in her 2019 article for the UCLA
Criminal Justice Law Review.447 Overall, one would be hard pressed to find a reform that
Chisholm has introduced without the help of more conservative actors.
While Chisholm’s goodwill with the police force enabled him to reduce incarceration, it
also may have also made him cautious about taking a tougher stance against police misconduct.
If Chisholm had found success in his handling of police crimes, the police might have withdrawn
their cooperation from his reform programs. For instance officers may have continued to make
jail defendants who should have been diverted to his mental health court. Officers have taken
similar action in response to Baltimore prosecutor Marilyn Mosby’s non-prosecution order.448 In
sum, Chisholm’s anti-carceral prosecution success required a strong relationship with the police
force and other actors, but prosecuting the police would have undermined the needed goodwill
with the police.
In light of this steep challenge, advocates should consider encouraging progressive
prosecutors to fully disconnect themselves from the investigation and prosecution of police
crimes. More specifically, advocates should urge prosecutors to put the handling of police
shootings entirely in the hands of an independent investigative team and prosecutor unit. By
taking that step, the prosecutor might be able to develop the goodwill and cooperation with the
police force that is critical to reducing incarceration, while at the same time leaving police
accountability to an external actor.
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Still, outsourcing the investigation and prosecution of police misconduct should be done
with care. That is, effort should be made to ensure an independent party handles prosecution.449 It
should also be kept in mind that outsourcing police prosecution could still cause disillusionment
among police officers, the police union, or the police commissioner. An additional caveat is that
state attorney generals are often ineffective at prosecuting the police. Nevertheless, outsourcing
police prosecutions is less likely to enrage the police force than handling police prosecutions
in-house. Moreover, as an interview participant told me, state attorney generals are not reliant on
the city police.450
In sum, Chisholm’s record shows that reducing incarceration and making prosecution
fairer requires cooperation with the police force, judges, the state legislature, and voters.
Chisholm’s incarceration alternatives for low-level drug crimes, low-level domestic violence
crimes, low-level crimes committed by veterans with PTSD, and low-level crimes committed by
individuals with mental health issues have required police cooperation. As shown in Figure 3:
Milwaukee County incarceration rates, these diversion programs have reduced the jail population
in Milwaukee County. At the same time, Chisholm’s need for a good relationship with the police
has constrained his ability to impose police accountability through prison sentences. For
example, Chisholm did not prosecute the police killing of Alvin Cole by the officer Joseph
Mensah. Furthermore, Chisholm’s diversion programs have required cooperation from judges
and state legislators, which Chisholm has obtained. Notably though, he has not issued a
non-prosecution order and he has focused his progressive reforms on non-violent offenders. I
contend that it is precisely because Chisholm has made these concessions that he has been able to
build support from more conservative agents needed to develop diversion alternatives. “There
449
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aren’t many standoffs,” a participant with direct knowledge of Chisholm’s office told me in an
interview.451
The implication of the Chisholm case is that an elected prosecutor can only make
movement toward the progressive ideal over time if they develop a harmonious relationship with
the police force, judges, state legislators, junior prosecutors, pretrial services, and the electorate.
But those crucial relationships are put in jeopardy when a prosecutor takes a forceful stand
against police crimes, makes a non-prosecution order, or changes their approach to violent
crimes. When it comes to prosecuting police abuse, I suggest that prosecutors allow the state
attorney general to take on the police prosecution role. In doing so, they will be more likely to
develop the cooperation from the police force that is needed to reduce incarceration while
simultaneously providing an opportunity for ensuring the prosecution of police abuse.
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VI. MELISSA NELSON: PROSECUTOR IN A CONSERVATIVE DISTRICT
Background
First elected in 2016, Melissa Nelson is the State Attorney for Clay, Duval and Nassau
Counties, Florida. Nelson is a Republican who came into office with the support of a Republican
electorate. Skeptics of progressive movement doubt that a prosecutor can succeed in moving
toward the progressive ideal in Republican areas.452 The anonymous Harvard author, for instance,
says that the hype behind the progressive prosecutor movement is based on a handful of
prosecutors who were elected “in liberal enclaves”453
Proponents, on the other hand, say the progressive prosecutor movement has bipartisan
potential.454 Heather Pickerell, for her part, points to Nelson to show progressive prosecutors can
succeed outside ultraliberal jurisdictions.455 I find that Nelson has found success in moving
toward two planks of the ideal: fairer process and less incarceration. But she has not made
progress toward prosecuting police misconduct. For that reason, Nelson’s case, when it comes to
two planks of the ideal, supports the view of advocates that the movement can be replicated in
conservative regions. By contrast, her record on police prosecution supports the view of the
critics. This finding is similar to my argument about Chisholm: his progress on diversion and
open evidence disclosure support the advocates’ claim that prosecutors can be progressive and
win re-election multiple times, while his decision to not prosecute the officers who killed Alvin
Cole and Dontre Hamilton supports the claim of the critics that police prosecution is impossible
because prosecutors rely on the police. Importantly though, Nelson and Chisholm are distinct
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both in terms of many specific reforms they implemented and because Chisholm is a multiterm
prosecutor while Nelson is a Republican.
I will first provide background on the the regressive approach of Angela Corey, Nelson’s
predecessor, on juvenile justice and the death penalty. Next, I will show that Nelson, by contrast,
has introduced a Conviction Review Unit, an expansive open-data program, developed a
non-arrest civil citation program for juveniles, reduced death penalty requests, and also expanded
her office’s juvenile diversion program through a restorative justice project. These results
generate a surprising hole in the skeptics’ argument. That is because the skeptics’ argument
indicates that a Republican in a Republican region should not be able to reduce incarceration,
reduce death penalty requests, and increase transparency due to pressure from judges, the police,
office norms, the electorate, and state and local officials.
In that way, Nelson’s case, like Chisholm’s, is one where the “paradox” view would lead
us to expect her failure on all three of the planks — not just one. But Nelson succeeded on two of
the planks, like Chisholm, because she made the following compromises needed to form a
coalition with more conservative actors: she abstained from prosecuting police abuse, refrained
from issuing a non-prosecution order, and neglected to take a merciful attitude toward violent
crime. These compromises have enabled her to build support from the conservative electorate,
the police force, judges, other court actors, and voters. Nelson needed the support of the police
force, judges, and voters to introduce a restorative justice for juveniles program and to establish a
screen against death penalty requests. By developing their support, Nelson ensured these
conservative actors would not challenge her progressive reforms. Nelson even needed police
support for her data transparency project. Nelson almost lost that support because she rushed the
project, so she changed her approach to always check in with the police beforehand. To reiterate,
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coalition-building with more conservative actors is both the most integral factor for success but
also operates as a constraint because it demands refraining from prosecuting police violence and
compromising the extent to which the prosecutor reduces incarceration and, to a lesser degree,
the extent to which they increase the fairness of the criminal judicial process.
Nelson’s predecessor Angela Corey had a punitive reputation as the State Attorney for
Florida’s Fourth Judicial District from 2009 to 2016.456 Her tenure was the opposite of the
progressive prosecutor ideal. “Is Angela Corey the Cruelest Prosecutor in America?” writer
Jessica Pishko famously asked in a cover story for The Nation.457 The article was published after
Corey brought a felony murder charge against a 12 year old boy.458 Experts have described Corey
“... one of the worst in America ...” 459 and “... one of the most aggressive in the country...”460
During her time as State Attorney, Corey’s office was among the country’s leaders in
executions461 and incarceration rates.462 Her approach to juvenile justice stood out.463 In addition
to Corey’s well-known tendency to try children as adults, her office incarcerated youth offenders
in “residential lockup facilities” at the highest rates in Florida.464 Not to mention that an
interview subject with close knowledge of the prosecution in Jacksonville said that corruption
was a major problem in Nelson’s office.465 In short Nelson’s predecessor, Angela Corey, is the
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epitome of the regressive prosecutor. She earned that distinction by leading the nation in
incarceration and executions, as well as by taking a vicious approach to juvenile justice.
Melissa Nelson beat Corey by 38 points in the 2016 Republican primary for State
Attorney, before running unopposed in the general election.466 Nelson’s background included
working as an assistant prosecutor in Corey’s office for over a decade and as an attorney for an
international corporate law firm.467 While Nelson and Corey are both Republicans, they have
different criminal justice philosophies. For example, Bazelon writes that Nelson left her job as
an assistant prosecutor in Corey’s office because she became disenchanted.468 After Nelson left,
she helped defend Cristian Fernandez, the 12-year-old charged with murder by Corey’s office.469
Nelson and her team made a plea deal with the government for a seven-year prison sentence for
Fernandez, far below the life sentence requested by Corey.470 When Nelson won, reformers
celebrated.471
Nelson pitched herself as the “tough but fair” candidate.472 Slansky says that Nelson
separated herself from Corey on juvenile justice, the death penalty, and conviction integrity.473
On juvenile justice, Nelson promised to give police officers more discretion to issue a penalty
called civil citations to juveniles.474 Civil citations allow young people who commit minor crimes
to avoid arrest and prosecution.475 As long as the juvenile completes their penalty, e.g., writes an
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essay or does community service, they do not face criminal consequences.476 Corey, on the other
hand, was against civil citations.477 On capital punishment, Nelson promised to put together a
team of experts to determine whether a death penalty request is warranted.478 This promise is
significant because of Corey’s aggressive pursuit of capital punishment. Finally, Nelson said she
was open to creating a conviction integrity unit, the first in the state.479 These units look at past
cases based on shaky evidence, such as mistaken testimony, and help overturn convictions when
appropriate.
Still, Nelson’s “tough but fair” campaign strategy placed emphasis on the “tough” part.
Leon Neyfakh, a reporter for Slate, looked at Nelson’s campaign website and was startled “... to
see the words ‘tough prosecutor,’ ‘tough on crime,’ and ‘endorsed by the NRA.’”480 The fact the
National Rifle Association endorsed a progressive prosecutor may appear surprising at first. But
James Forman Jr. points out that “gun control” has often meant criminalization, while Pfaff says
that “gun rights” can be used as a pitch for reducing criminal penalties for gun possession.481
Pfaff adds that reform-minded prosecutors in conservative regions should avoid the social justice
rhetoric that many progressive prosecutors use.482 Pfaff instead encourages reform-minded
prosecutors in Republican regions to emphasize gun rights.483 Nelson took an approach that in
some ways resembles Pfaff’s advice: her campaign spokesperson said that her win was not a
victory for the left, and Nelson touted her NRA endorsement on the campaign trail.484
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Slansky says that while Nelson’s agenda was less punitive than Corey’s, on the whole it
was in line with the tough-on-crime norm in prosecutor elections.485 Nevertheless, scholars
classify Nelson as a member of the progressive prosecutor cohort.486 Pickerell says that a
prosecutor’s progressive prosecutor credentials should be based on whether they are addressing
the specific problems in their district.487 While not revolutionary, Pickerell says that Nelson has
focused on addressing the issues important to her district: juvenile justice, the death penalty, and
wrongful convictions.488
Nelson’s focus on wrongful convictions falls under the procedural plank of progressive
prosecution, while her focus on reducing juvenile sentences and death penalty requests fall under
anti-carceral prosecution. That is because procedural justice promotes adherence to fair
prosecutions, such as ensuring that innocent people are not convicted, while anti-carceral
prosecution means cutting back incarcerations and capital punishment.489
In sum, an NRA-backed Republican in Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit defeated a harsh
incumbent on promises to reduce the incarceration of juveniles, reduce the death penalty, and
introduce fairer process. In the next discussion, I test the degree to which Nelson has achieved
the progressive ideal. My hypothesis is that Nelson’s tenure marks major progress toward the
anti-carceral and procedural ideal compared to her predecessor, which is an improvement worth
building on. In short, her tenure is a strike against the critics’ claim that progressive prosecution
cannot succeed in conservative areas.
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A. Procedural justice
Melissa Nelson has called herself a “firm believer” in procedural justice, an interview
participant told me.490 Her policies show that to be true. Since entering office in 2017, Nelson
formed a conviction review team,491 participated in a study funded by the MacArthur foundation
to track racial disparities in her office,492 and has stressed to her junior prosecutors that they
should not file borderline cases — cases that cannot be proven in trial.493 Nelson’s decision to
establish a conviction integrity unit has received the most attention.494 When she ran for office in
2016, Nelson displayed an openness to forming a conviction integrity unit, says Slansky.495
Pickerell adds that wrongful convictions were a particular problem in Angela Corey’s office,
Nelson’s hardline predecessor.496 She has also made notable compromises: Nelson invites the
input of the police before implementing a new policy and her conviction review unit focuses
solely on claims of factual innocence instead of excessive sentences. Moreover, she does not
describe her fair process reforms as progressive. These compromises may have helped her to
build a coalition of junior prosecutors, federal officials, state legislators, police, and voters that
was needed to increase procedural fairness in her district. A table of Nelson’s key reform,
compromises, concessions, and collaborators can be found in Table 3: Progress toward the ideal.
A year after taking office, on January 5th, 2018, Nelson made the landmark decision to
establish the first conviction integrity unit in Florida.497 She tapped Shelley Thibodeau, a
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longtime defense lawyer, to lead the team.498 Nelson received only $41,000 from the Florida state
legislature to fund the unit.499 But the conviction integrity review unit received $200,000 in grant
funding from the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) program. 500 That
funding goes toward DNA testing, the investigator, and working with Florida’s Innocence
Project chapter.501 Pickerell describes Nelson’s unit as “robust.”502 Currently, the unit consists of
director Shelley Thibodeau, an investigator, and a support staff.503 Between 2018 and 2020, the
unit received almost 200 innocence petitions and secured exonerations for three individuals.504
The interview subject I spoke to who has direct knowledge about the Jacksonville
prosecutor’s office described Nelson’s Conviction Review Unit as “essentially an in-house
Innocence Project.”505 In general, conviction review units investigate claims of innocence and
seek exonerations when they find facts to support a given claim. But no two conviction review
units are alike.506 Nelson’s unit only accepts innocence claims from individuals convicted in
Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit (Clay, Duval, and Nassau Counties).507 Moreover, the unit
focuses solely on claims of innocence.508 Incarcerated individuals who do not claim innocence
and instead claim they received an excessive sentence, for instance, are not eligible.509 That is

Pantazi, “In a Florida first.”
Pantazi, “In a Florida first.”
500
Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with author).
501
Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with author).
502
Pickerell, “Bona Fide Progressive Prosecutor,” 42.
503
Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with author).
504
“Conviction Integrity Unit,” Office of the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, accessed
February 11, 2021.
505
Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with author).
506
Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with author).
507
“Conviction Integrity Unit”; Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with
author).
508
“Conviction Integrity Unit”; Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with
author).
509
“Conviction Integrity Unit”; Phone call with interview subject (February 10, 2021) (on file with
author).
498
499

93

different from Brooklyn district attorney Eric Gonzalez’s Post-Conviction Justice Bureau510 and
Mosby’s Sentencing Review Unit,511 which do review those cases. Nelson’s unit has a more
narrow scope because of funding limitations, an interview participant told me.512
But the budget does not tell the whole story. I assert that Nelson’s focus on factual
innocence (rather than extreme sentences and/or cases tainted by an unfair process in which guilt
is still clear) marks a strategic decision, rather than a budgetary one. While the unit has only
$241,000 in funding, that money could be evenly allocated across extreme sentences, unfair
process, and factual innocence, rather entirely directed toward factual innocence. Certainly, the
fact that Nelson is operating under pressure from a conservative electorate and an especially
conservative court system may have pushed her to take a less controversial path on conviction
integrity review compared to some of her colleagues in more liberal environments.
An incarcerated individual who meets the eligibility criteria can fill out the form on the
website and send it to the unit.513 One question on the form, for instance, says: “Please explain in
detail why you are innocent of this crime.”514 Next, a member of the review team will look at the
petition. If the petitioner is eligible, an employee in the unit will proceed to read the trial
transcript to determine whether the information brought in the claim had been considered in
court.515 From there, they may go to the “vault” — the room in the district attorney’s office
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where physical evidence is stored.516 The process can also involve returning to the place where
the crime occurred, connecting with witnesses who support the petition, speaking with experts
who testified at the trial, and running experiments to confirm the innocence claim.517 The process
is called a “re-investigation,” an interview subject who has close knowledge of the process told
me.518 Finally, if the re-investigation supports the innocence petition, the leader of the unit will
ask a defense lawyer to file a “post-conviction motion,” which allows the judge to consider the
innocence claim.519 Next, the judge can choose to authorize the claim, which triggers an
exoneration.520
In addition to Nelson’s conviction review unit, she has taken measures to track racial
disparities and expand transparency. John Chisholm was not the only prosecutor to participate in
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s joint project between Florida International
University (FIU) and Loyola University of Chicago. Nelson, as well as Kim Foxx of Chicago,
and Andrew Warren of Tampa also took part. 521 Nelson allowed the FIU-Loyola researchers to
track close to 90,000 cases in the Jacksonville prosecutor’s office over a two-year period, from
2017 to 2018.522 The study investigated whether race influenced five different decisions in
Nelson’s office: charging decision (charge, dismiss, or divert), change in the seriousness of the
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charge from arrest to filing, change in the seriousness of the charge between the original filing to
the conclusion of the case, conclusion of the case, and sentence.523
Beyond approving the public release of the MacArthur study, Nelson set up a data
dashboard in 2021 to increase transparency, based on metrics provided by Fair and Just
Prosecution.524 The dashboard, available on her office’s website, provides statistical information
on different aspects of the prosecution process.525 For example, there are graphs about charge
filing rates across racial groups, the speed at which her office concludes each case, and
conviction review investigation rates over time.526 This data dashboard was made possible
through Nelson’s work with the FIU-Loyola researchers.527 In addition to the data release, Nelson
set up annual training about the importance of complying with evidence disclosure laws528
Florida laws require that prosecutors turn over all critical evidence to the defense, and Nelson
emphasizes the importance of evidence disclosure by providing a checklist to attorneys of the
evidence that must be handed over.529
Nelson’s procedural reforms have included forming the first conviction review unit in
Florida, allowing researchers to study racial disparities in her office, releasing data to the public,
and emphasizing the importance of not overcharging. Brought together, Nelson’s reforms
increase the fairness of prosecutions in her district. Nelson has addressed the issue of wrongful
punishment through the formation of the first conviction review unit in Florida, challenged the
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“black box” norm through expansive data transparency, and subverted the “win at all costs”
convention by instructing junior prosecutors to not overcharge as a means to coerce a plea-deal.
Importantly, Nelson cooperated with non-state actors on her data projects, including the
MacArthur Foundation and Fair and Just Prosecution, as well as her junior prosecutors.
Moreover, she learned from the open-data project about the importance of conferring with the
police force before introducing a new policy. Additionally, Nelson frames the open-data project
as furthering “good government,” rather than progressive prosecution. Furthermore, Nelson
received funding for a conviction review unit from the Florida state legislature and from the
Department of Justice. Her conviction review unit, while significant, also contains the
compromise of focusing exclusively on factual innocence instead of excessive sentences.
Nelson’s record on procedural justice, then, entailed collaboration from more conservative
actors, including state legislators, voters, the police, and the Department of Justice. Nelson may
have bolstered her capacity to build support from these actors by making the compromise of
telling the police before any new policy, focusing exclusively on factual innocence, and forming
a “good government” based justification for her data projects.
B. Carceral progressivism
Nelson has shown promise on procedural justice and anti-carceral prosecution metrics but
less progress on police accountability. For example, in August, 2020, Nelson’s office announced
that 16 police shootings would not result in criminal charges.530 The investigations of so-called
officer-involved shootings are first examined by a unit inside Nelson’s office, while the
Jacksonville Sheriff's Office or Florida’s Law Enforcement division play a primary role in
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running the investigation.531 Nelson makes the charging decisions.532 Nelson has not brought
charges against any police officer for excessive force, and there have been 945 use of force
incidents between 2017 and 2018.533 Nelson has also received criticism for the slow pace at
which her office investigates police incidents, compared to her predecessor.534 Still, Nelson
promised to release body camera footage within a month of police incidents in response to
pressure from activists.535
Nelson, like Chisholm, is communicative when it comes to police investigations. The fact
that progressive prosecutor advocates encourage prosecutors to release police shooting
investigation information indicates that traditional prosecutors often refrain from doing so.536 On
the Jacksonville prosecutor office’s website, there are folders from 2017 to 2020, which contain
information about police shooting investigations.537 Each folder contains documents detailing the
office’s decisions in specific investigations. The information presented includes the evidence that
was examined, the witnesses, and the results of the investigation. Although commentators have
criticized the speed at which Nelson’s office releases body camera footage, she deserves credit
for releasing a significant amount of police shooting investigation information.
One document ends with the following statement: “Based on this review, and our review
of applicable Florida law, Deputies Mendez and Cox use of deadly force was justified. We will
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take no further action.”538 It is hard to judge a prosecutor’s success on police accountability
without looking at each case to see whether the office made the correct decision. But Nelson has
not filed charges against any officer. It is unclear whether the issue stems from Nelson’s worries
about angering the police, the investigative process, or the wording of Florida’s laws surrounding
the police use of force. It could also be that the police in Nelson’s jurisdiction have not engaged
in an inappropriate use of force, but that is unlikely. For example, Melissa Nelson’s office
determined in 2017 that officer Tyler Landreville’s high-profile killing of a young man named
Vernell Bing Jr. was justified.539 The killing of Bing Jr. was met with significant media coverage
and activist pushback.540 In 2019, officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office killed 6 people.541
As one community advocate asked at a protest against police brutality in Jacksonville last year,
“So, who does Melissa Nelson stand with, the people of Jacksonville or the bullies at the
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office?”542 The key takeaway is that Nelson has been relatively transparent
about police shooting investigations but has been reluctant to prosecute police abuse.
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Anti-carceral prosecution
Figure 4: Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit incarceration rates543

Figure 4 shows that jail admissions in Duval and Clay County have declined since Nelson
took office. Nelson’s anti-carceral reforms have been impressive: She has established a
restorative justice program for juveniles,544 extended the civil citation program for young people
who commit crimes,545 offered a “seal and expunge” event,546 and adjusted her office’s approach
to the death penalty.547 Notably, Nelson has taken these steps even though she has only been in
office for one term so far: an interview subject with direct knowledge of Nelson’s office told me
over video chat that cash-bail reform will be prioritized in Nelson's second term.548 Nelson’s
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interest in restorative justice has been documented by Bazelon,549 as well as Olivia Dana and
Sherene Crawford.550 In Charged, Bazelon describes Nelson’s early experimentation with
restorative justice in a pair of murder cases.551 Bazelon says the experience inspired Nelson to
form an advisory committee to explore restorative justice.552 The advisory committee, formed
early in Nelson’s tenure, included judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, academics, nonprofit
directors, the mayor, the sheriff, and members of community groups.553 Lauren Abramson, the
leader of a restorative justice unit in Baltimore, also gave Nelson advice about how to bring her
vision into action.554 Later, Nelson’s director of Victim Services and director of the Juvenile
Division submitted a successful grant proposal to the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) Fund to hire
a restorative justice director.555 Nelson established the role in November 2019 and filled it in
mid-January 2020: It is “the first position of its kind in any State Attorney's office in Florida,” an
interview participant with close knowledge of Nelson’s internal operations told me.556
Right now, the restorative justice program is available only for young people. However,
Nelson’s office hopes to later expand the initiative to include adults.557 Moreover, the program is
primarily used in nonviolent cases. But Nelson’s “endgame,” I learned from an interview, is to
use restorative justice for violent crimes, as well.558 As of now, the juvenile restorative justice
program in Nelson’s office works as follows: First, a prosecutor or a defense lawyer sends a case
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to the Center for Children’s Rights (CCR), a Jacksonville-based legal resource and advocacy
group.559 From there CCR will review the case. If they want to move forward, CCR will reach
out to the victim, the person who committed the crime, and the lawyers to ensure everyone
agrees to pursue restorative justice. Next, the group chooses a convenient location to convene a
meeting. At the meeting, the participants discuss the incident and the harm it caused. The parties
then decide a plan for the person who caused the harm to show they will not cause similar harm
again — for instance, the person responsible might promise to take classes at a local community
college. Generally the timeframe is two to four months, and the plan needs to be feasible.560
From there, the Center for Children’s Rights will contact the director of the juvenile restorative
justice program once the arrangement has been fulfilled. Next, the director will inform the
prosecutor, who will drop the case.561
The restorative justice program is a part of the office’s juvenile justice diversion
program.562 Diversion refers to incarceration alternatives. The most frequent cases resolved
through restorative justice include burglary and theft, while domestic and sexual violence cases
are generally handled with traditional prosecutions.563 With that said, each case is considered on
an individual basis.564 Moreover, the agreement that is made in the conference can go in different
directions:565 The facilitator, victim and person responsible, determine the best course of action
given the harm and the context of the harm.566 Restorative justice allows the victim and the
perpetrator to talk to each other, which does happen in the traditional criminal process.567 By
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launching the first in-house restorative justice program in Florida, Nelson’s office seeks to
“redefine justice.”568
In addition to Nelson’s restorative justice program, she has established a civil citation
program for juveniles.569 Civil citations were a dividing issue between Nelson and Corey on the
campaign trail. In May 2017, Nelson announced an expansion of the civil citation program
alongside the Jacksonville Mayor, the Sheriff, a judge, and the superintendent of Duval County
Public School.570 The civil citation program allows eligible young people to avoid arrest and a
criminal record altogether.571 Indeed, the program gives police officers the option to place
juveniles who commit non-serious crimes into a teen court, where they may receive a penalty
such as community service or writing an essay.572 Nelson increased the crimes that can be
resolved with civil citation to include low-level battery and non-violent resistance to an arrest.573
Moreover, Nelson made it such that a police officer can grant a civil citation without receiving
authorization from a prosecutor.574 The decision to extend the civil citation program was not
made by Nelson alone: almost two dozen correctional, law enforcement, judicial, and child
service agencies approved the expansion.575
The key distinction between the civil citation and juvenile restorative justice programs is
that the former is set up to avoid an arrest and an ensuing record while the latter does not always
allow the participant to avoid an arrest record.576 Still, Nelson’s office held a “Sealing and
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Expunging Fair” in January of 2020.577 At that fair, residents could make a request to have their
criminal records cleared.578
Beyond Nelson’s restorative justice program for children, expansion of civil citations,
and her office’s Sealing and Expunging fair, Nelson also shifted her office’s approach to the
death penalty: she requires her prosecutors to receive authorization from a committee of nine
supervisors in order to request the death penalty.579 Nelson’s policy follows how most
progressive prosecutors in states with capital punishment approach the death penalty.580 An
exception is Florida prosecutor Aramis Ayala, whose refusal to seek the death penalty, resulted in
a legal battle with the Florida state attorney general and governor, and her eventual
resignation.581 Another exception is Denver prosecutor Beth McCann, who has a policy to never
seek the death penalty.582 Moreover, Beth McCann banded with other district attorneys in her
state to lobby the Colorado state legislature to overturn the death penalty.583
Nelson’s decision to establish the first restorative justice unit within a prosecutor office in
Florida, broaden the civil citation program, and reduce death penalty requests marks progress
toward anti-carceral prosecution. Nelson’s anti-carceral policies are especially important in the
context of her predecessor’s draconian approach to juvenile justice and the death penalty.
Corey’s tenure, that is, provides an indication about the kinds of practices that would likely still
be occurring in Florida’s Fourth Judicial District had a progressive prosecutor not come to
power. Moreover, Nelson’s restorative justice program stands out because it pushes against the
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narrow confines of the adversarial system. Nelson’s anti-carceral reforms accord with how an
interview subject with direct experience in her office described her philosophy: “we do not
always have to do things the way they’ve always been done.”584
Notably, Nelson has obtained either cooperation or approval from more conservative
actors for all her anti-carceral reforms. Nelson’s civil citation program received approval from
the Sheriff, the Mayor, junior prosecutors, correctional staff, and judges. In addition, her
restorative justice committee consists of judges, prosecutors, the mayor and the sheriff. Finally,
her death penalty screen consists of senior prosecutors in her office. Nelson has also needed
citizen support for these changes. Nelson may have been able to obtain cooperation from more
conservative court and non-court actors because she made certain compromises. More
specifically, her civil citation and juvenile justice programs apply primarily to nonviolent
offenders and she has set up a screen against requesting the death penalty rather than a refusal to
seek death against a defendant.
The compromises progressive prosecutors must make in conservative areas
Nelson has made commendable progress toward procedural justice and anti-carceral
prosecution. On the issue of procedural justice, Nelson formed the first conviction review unit in
Florida, participated in an open-data initiative through a research project funded by the
MacArthur foundation, and emphasized evidence disclosure. These policies display an effort to
make prosecutions fairer. On the anti-carceral prosecution front, Nelson has expanded civil
citations, introduced a restorative justice department for juveniles, put in place a screen against
requesting the death penalty, and offered an event to clear criminal records. These policies are a
departure from the tough practices toward juvenile justice and the death penalty put in place by
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her predecessor. When it comes to carceral progressivism, however, Nelson, like most
prosecutors, has not been successful in securing convictions against officers who commit
wrongdoings.
In that way, Nelson’s success tracks Chisholm’s success. Both prosecutors have been
effective at expanding the range of options for avoiding prison and jail sentences. Figures 3 and 4
document trends in incarceration rates in Milwaukee County and Florida’s Fourth Judicial
Circuit with a dashed line for when Chisholm and Nelson were elected. Moreover, both
prosecutors have improved procedural fairness by opening their data to the public and through
other measures. At the same time, both Nelson and Chisholm have yet to challenge the
perception that prosecutors are too friendly in their approach to handling police shootings. For
that reason, advocates should consider whether local prosecutors are well-equipped to reign in
the police while working with the police on reforms to reduce incarceration at the same time. It
may be that the local prosecutor should allow the state attorney general to handle police shooting
investigations, as some scholars and one interview subject I spoke to suggest.585
Nelson’s partnerships with progressive non-state actors and more conservative agents
have proven critical to her success on the procedural justice and anti-carceral prosecution planks.
For instance, Nelson’s data initiative involved assistance from MacArthur-backed researchers.
That collaborative effort supports Nelson’s efforts to develop the tools for additional data
tracking. The Foundation, for example, gave Nelson’s office the funding to hire two statisticians
to help the office to continue tracking and releasing data.586 Partnerships have also proven
essential to Nelson’s ability to roll out anti-carceral reforms. Her civil citations program entails
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working with the Jacksonville Sheriff to ensure police officers write out non-criminal penalties
for eligible juveniles, rather than place them under arrest. It should be noted that police officers,
judges, and child service agencies signed on to the expansion of the civil citation program. In
addition, Nelson had support from the superintendent of Duval County Public School. Also,
Nelson’s restorative justice program involves working with the Center for Children’s Rights in
Jacksonville, who help coordinate and facilitate the conferences. That project was informed in
large part by input from Nelson’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee, which includes judges,
defense lawyers, nonprofit groups, and other actors.
Notably, Nelson faced blowback when she released the public data dashboard because
she did not reach agreement with other actors beforehand: “It stressed some people out,” an
interview participant told me.587 I learned that “people [Nelson] works with, not in the office,”
were anxious the data dashboard might put them in a bad light.588 An interview participant told
me Nelson had not checked in with those actors to let them know about the dashboard before
putting it out to the public.589 Nelson’s experience with the data dashboard supports Davis’s
suggestion that prosecutors should invite input from other actors before rolling out a new
policy.590
In addition to forming partnerships, Nelson’s framing strategy for her procedural justice
and anti-carceral prosecution reforms stand out. Since Nelson is a rare example of a Republican
progressive prosecutor in a Republican area, it is interesting to see how she pitches her reforms.
Nelson advances the “return on investment” framing. The “return on investment” argument is the
idea that a massive prison and jail population is not worth the fiscal costs because the benefits
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589
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are minimal.591 For example, the Jacksonville prosecutor’s website calls the civil citation
program, “... a solution that offers [juveniles] an alternative to entering the criminal justice
system and saves taxpayer dollars.”592 Nelson’s op-ed with prosecutor Andrew Warren in The
Tampa Bay Times, also exemplifies the sentiment. The article starts with the statement,
“Government cannot be run like a business, but it can — and should — adhere to certain
business principles.”593 The article goes on to explain that data tracking helps Nelson and Warren
ensure efficiency and fairness in service of promoting “better government.”594 Nelson is not
alone in her “return on investment” strategy. Larry Krasner, for his part, received extensive
attention for his memo requiring assistant prosecutors to tell the judge the financial costs of the
requested sentence and the reason for which the cost is justified.595
Nelson does not self-describe as a progressive prosecutor. I learned from an interview
subject with direct knowledge about the Jacksonville prosecutor’s office that Nelson does not
share observers’ characterization of her campaign against Corey. Her position, said the interview
participant, is that “[She] was attacking what [she] believed to be an abuse of the office. But, it’s
been recast as reform-minded prosecutor versus antiquated prosecutor.”596 Nelson finds the
progressive prosecutor label “intriguing,” said the interview participant, but does not adopt the
label because “progressive, if tagged as that, puts [her] in a liberal camp.”597 Similarly, Nelson
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describes her forward-looking policies as “Smart Justice reforms and initiatives,” rather than
progressive initiatives.598
Nelson’s significant success toward anti-carceral prosecution and procedural prosecution
has been driven by her ability to build alliances with more conservative actors. That same
cooperation could be the reason behind Nelson’s less than stellar record on prosecuting the
police. In that way, it is difficult to ask the police to cooperate with non-arrest reform, while also
prosecuting them. A prosecutor could choose to prioritize prosecuting police misconduct, but
that might come at the expense of reducing incarceration. In addition, Nelson has used the
“return on investment” tactic as justification for her policies. That approach, as I mentioned
before, has critics. Marie Gottschalk, for her part, says the fiscal argument is too practical and
undermines long-term movement action.599 Michelle Alexander, for her part, says the “return on
investment” approach will dissolve when economic conditions improve,600 and John Pfaff says
the financial costs of incarceration are exaggerated and pale in comparison to the fiscal costs of
expanding the social safety net.601 Not to mention that fiscal arguments are usually limited to
calls for mercy for nonviolent drug offenders.602
Even with the criticisms against Nelson’s framing in mind, her tenure shows a prosecutor
can make progressive reforms toward reducing incarceration and improving the fairness of the
criminal process in a conservative district. Moreover, Nelson’s early experimentation with
restorative justice in murder cases and willingness to express interest in finding alternative ways
to deal with violent crimes show that, despite her emphasis on fiscal concerns, she is willing to
push against the dominant reform consensus.
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It warrants emphasis that Nelson has obtained cooperation from conservative voters, the
police, the Sheriff, the mayor, correctional officers, judges, and her staff in order to introduce her
civil citation program and restorative justice for juveniles. She also received cooperation from
her senior prosecutors in her office to introduce a screen against the death penalty. Even Nelson’s
procedural justice reforms, including her conviction review unit and open-data project have
involved collaboration with legislators, federal officials, and junior prosecutors. Moreover,
Nelson’s progressive reforms have required support from the electorate, which she has promoted
through a “return on investment” framing.
Nelson’s reforms have been significant but have also entailed bowing to the limits
imposed by the need for collaboration with more conservative actors. Table 3: Progress toward
the ideal summarizes her key collaborations. Nelson has not issued a non-prosecution order, has
not focused reforms on violent offenders, has not issued a categorical refusal to request the death
penalty, and has pursued the “return on investment” framing to justify her policies. Furthermore,
Nelson’s conviction review unit focuses only on factual innocence. Obtaining cooperation
through compromise and concessions has been essential for her success toward increasing fair
process and reducing incarceration, but coalition-building also prevents her from prosecuting
police abuse and limits the extent to which she can reduce incarceration or increase procedural
fairness. Nelson is distinct from Chisholm because she is a Republican in a conservative area.
The compromises I have highlighted in the Chisholm and Nelson cases are often
informal. That is, Nelson and Chisholm do not tell the police and other more conservative actors
that they will not prosecute abuse, will not focus on violent crimes, will not issue a
non-prosecution order, and will disconnect themselves from the progressive prosecutor label in
order to receive cooperation for diversion and open-data projects. When we consider the
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counter-example of Marilyn Mosby, who has not made many of these compromises, it becomes
clear that these informal compromises promote success toward reducing incarceration and
increasing procedural fairness even though they limit the extent to which those two planks can be
pursued and prevent the realization of prosecuting police abuse altogether.
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VII: MARILYN MOSBY: UNCOMPROMISING PROSECUTOR
Background
The anonymous author of the Harvard Law Review note highlights Mosby to show that
progressive prosecution is impossible. I find that Mosby has been bold in her efforts to increase
the fairness of the judicial process: her office expanded funding for her conviction integrity unit
in 2018, re-examined cases connected to a disreputable officer in response to a July, 2017
incident, established a “do not call” list in December, 2019, a “no-knock” prohibition in October,
2020, a deportation-mindfulness memo in April, 2017, lobbied legislators to require
compensation for the wrongly convicted in February, 2020, and intrdouced a Sentencing Review
United in December, 2020. While Mosby’s procedural justice orders were bolder than her
counterparts in Jacksonville and Milwaukee, she later backtracked on some of them. For
example, Mosby later said her office would still call on the officers in the “do not call” list for
testimony.
Second, Mosby made waves on the carceral progressivism front when she prosecuted the
killers of Freddie Gray in 2015. And yet, the case was unsuccessful. Second, the failed
prosecution made the police force and activists angry, albeit for different reasons. Also, Mosby’s
office dumped 15 charges into Keith Davis Jr., who had been shot at 44 times by the police
during a chase in June, 2015.
Third, Mosby has taken remarkable anti-carceral measures, including a 2015 diversion
program called AIM to B’More, a June, 2019 marijuana non-prosecution order, and an expansive
COVID-19 non-prosecution order in March, 2020. Yet the police officers continued to make
arrests for the marijuana non-prosecution order, the governor attacked Mosby, and activists were
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upset because Mosby’s office continued to prosecute conduct that, they said, should have fallen
under the non-prosecution order.
Mosby’s rocky tenure, for the Harvard author, shows that progressive prosecution is
impossible. By contrast, I posit that Mosby has been too uncompromising. Table 3: Progress
toward the ideal provides a sketch of Mosby’s progress and concessions along with the progress
and concessions of her counterparts in Milwaukee County and Jacksonville, Florida. She has
moved too fast and too hard through her non-prosecution orders in particular, which has
generated extensive pushback. Moreover, Mosby’s decision to take on the police who killed
Freddie Gray, while commendable, may have lost her the goodwill with the police that she
needed to find success in moving forward smoothly with non-prosecution. In addition, Mosby,
unlike Chisholm and Nelson, has embraced the “progressive prosecutor” label. Her embrace of
the label and the force of her rhetoric, however, have not enabled her to push through her reforms
in a manner that is sustainable.
Baltimore City State’s Attorney Gregg Bernstein held office for just four years when
Marilyn Mosby, then a 34-year-old603 lawyer for an insurance company, beat him in the 2014
Democratic primary.604 As Mosby’s background shows, not all progressive prosecutors are
former civil rights lawyers or activists. But all progressive prosecutors do share a commitment to
at least one of the three core goals of the progressive prosecutor project highlighted in Part II.
During his short time as Baltimore’s head prosecutor, Bernstein formed two units within his
office that concentrated on gang activity and sex crimes, respectively.605 In addition to these
units, Bernstein’s self-proclaimed legacy included securing guilty verdicts against 200 of “the
Slansky, “Changing Political Landscape,” 654.
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2014.
605
Ian Duncan, “Baltimore prosecutor hits streets to start re-election campaign,” The Baltimore Sun, April
19, 2014; Duncan, “Mosby unseats Bernstein.”
603

604

113

city’s worst criminals”606 and increasing the office’s felony conviction rate.607 Reflecting on his
four years as elected prosecutor, Bernstein said, “the office is much more efficient, more
effective, it’s more focused.”608
Bernstein also started a wrongful prosecution unit and introduced community based
prosecution.609 Wrongful prosecution units look at old cases to ensure the evidence merits a
conviction. Community prosecution, on the other hand, means assigning specific prosecutors to
work exclusively in specific neighborhoods. Bernstein’s prosecution integrity unit advanced fair
process. At the same time, Bernstein increased felony conviction rates. In that way, the Bernstein
case supports Benjamin Levin’s claim that a prosecutor can improve the procedures of their
office and still be pro-carceral.610
Notably, Patricia Jessamy, the prosecutor who preceded Bernstein, had established a “do
not call” list, which shows a historical commitment to fair procedure in the Baltimore office.611 A
do not call list is a register of police officers deemed uncredible. The “do not call” list caused
problems for Jessamy, whose uneasy relationship with the police department contributed to her
loss to Bernstein.612 Once in office, Bernstein, a white man, faced controversy when he declined
to pursue a case against the police officers connected to the killing of Tyrone West, a 44 year old
Black painter from Baltimore.613
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After Mosby’s victory over Bernstein in the primary, she easily claimed victory in the
general election, winning 94 percent of the vote against a write-in candidate.614 Mosby’s victory
was a significant development, as only one percent of chief prosecutors are women of color.615
Moreover, Mosby is described in the literature as an early progressive prosecutor (she was
elected in 2014, a year before the movement took fire).616
Slansky writes that Mosby ran a “tough-on-crime” campaign with a twist.617 Mosby’s
rhetoric surrounding violent crime was traditional, says Slansky:618 she stressed that she would
take a harder line against repeat violent offenders than the incumbent.619 At the same time,
Mosby broke convention by saying she would take on police misconduct.620 Mosby also
promised to act more forgiving toward first time low-level offenders.621
Mosby had to deal with a fundraising disadvantage and limited experience as a
prosecutor.622 Still, Mosby came from a family of police officers and her husband was a former
City Council member.623 Even so, Bernstein did not acknowledge Mosby for much of the race,
says Slansky.624 Bernstein’s campaign criticized Mosby for her lack of experience in the final
stretch of the race.625 Mosby, for her part, had worked for five years as an assistant prosecutor for
the Baltimore State Attorney’s office followed by a three year period as a lawyer for a big
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insurance company before she took office in 2014.626 Observers were surprised by Mosby’s
55-45 percent win over Bernstein in the primary.627 Her victory made her the youngest big-city
prosecutor in the country.628
Four months into Mosby’s tenure, she made a move that garnered her national
prominence.629 Mosby brought charges against the six police officers who killed Freddie Gray, a
twenty-five year old Black man from West Baltimore, on April 12, 2015. 630 The killing of Gray
had been met with mass protests against police brutality.631 Mosby’s decision to bring
second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and false imprisonment charges against the
officers632 was widely praised by racial justice advocates.633 Slansky says the decision may have
pacified the unrest in Baltimore.634 Nevertheless, three of the officers were eventually acquitted
and Mosby went on to dismiss the charges against the final three officers.635 Still, the anonymous
author of the Harvard Law Review note says it was Mosby’s decision to prosecute the officers in
the Gray case that led commentators to designate her a progressive prosecutor.636
In December of 2020, Mosby made a statement that showed a willingness to identify as
part of the progressive prosecutor cohort:
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Many other cities understand and recognize that we have to release those individuals that
pose no public safety risk. You look at Aisha Braveboy in the state of Maryland, you look
at Dan Satterberg, Larry Krasner, Chesa Boudin's office, Eric Gonzalez's office and now
George Gascón. This is what we're attempting to do.637
Mosby made this statement during an interview with The Appeal, a news outlet that reports on
progressive prosecutors. She was referring to her rollout of a sentencing review unit, a team of
prosecutors who look at old sentences to see if they are too heavy.638
In the literature, Mosby is regarded as a member of the progressive prosecutor group.639
But the Harvard author is skeptical: “... Her zeal obscures her complicity,” they write.640
Additional scholars who have given Mosby specific attention include Slansky and King County
defense lawyer Darcey Covert. Slansky draws on the Mosby case to highlight a new dynamic in
prosecutor elections: It is now possible for a challenger to win by promising to be tougher on the
police.641 Additionally, King County defense lawyer Darcy Covert touches on Mosby in his
forthcoming article for the Wisconsin Law Review. Covert observes that the Baltimore police
department continued making arrests over Mosby’s nonprosecution orders.642 Covert draws on
that to show that the police present a barrier to progressive prosecution.643 But Mosby’s tenure,
with the exception of the Harvard author, Slansky, and Covert, has not received significant
individual attention in the literature. In the following section, I examine the degree to which
Mosby has achieved the progressive ideal. I predict that Marilyn Mosby represents an
Greenwald, “Newly Sworn-In.”
Greenwald, “Newly Sworn-In.”
639
Pickerell, “Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook,” 18; Green and Roiphe, “When Prosecutors Politick,”
18.
640
Note, “Paradox,” 750.
641
Slansky, “Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook,” 667.
642
Covert, “Transforming,” 14.
643
Covert, “Transforming,” 14.
637
638

117

overlooked model for progressive prosecution because of her anti-carceral policies and her
commitment to prosecuting police misconduct. The fact that different scholars can come to
different conclusions about a district attorney’s progressive prosecutor credentials reflects the
lack of scholarly consensus about what policies or traits constitute progressive prosecution. But
applying Levin’s three-planked model provides a helpful framework for evaluating a
prosecutor’s progressivism because, as I asserted in Part II, nearly every advocate of progressive
prosecution is invested in advancing at least one of the three planks. A full list of key reforms
and concessions under each plank of the progressive prosecutor model for Mosby, Nelson, and
Chisholm can be found under Table 3: Progress toward the ideal. I also refer the reader to Figure
5, which provides the incarceration rates in Baltimore, City over time with a dashed line when
Mosby took office.
A. Procedural justice
Marilyn Mosby has initiated six reforms that connect to the procedural justice ideal. She
bolstered her office’s Conviction Integrity Unit,644 re-examined previous cases handled by a
police officer who engaged in wrongful conduct,645 developed a do-not-call list,646 took a stand
against no-knock warrants,647 and established a Sentencing Review Unit.648 Finally, her lead
assistant issued a memo reminding assistant prosecutors to remain mindful of deportation
implications in low-level cases against undocumented immigrants.649 Despite these movements
toward the procedural plank of the ideal, interview participants I spoke to describe Mosby’s
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Sentencing Review Unit as symbolic and assert Mosby’s office accepts countless cases from the
police force that it should not.650 I will start by discussing Mosby’s procedural reforms and then
their significance before moving on to critiques against these reforms made by interview subjects
who have experience watching court proceedings in Jacksonville and secondary sources.
Mosby’s most significant procedural justice reform is her work on conviction integrity.
When she took office in 2015, Mosby inherited a Conviction Integrity Unit from her predecessor,
Gregg Bernstein. In 2014, Bernstein’s unit helped wipe Walter Lomax’s record, a Black man who
was wrongfully convicted in 1968 and released from prison in 2006.651 During the transition,
Mosby promoted Antonio Gioia, Bernstein’s Conviction Integrity Chief, to the position of deputy
state’s attorney of major crimes.652 She went on to promote assistant prosecutor Lauren
Lipscomb to take Gioia’s place and serve as the Conviction Integrity Chief.653 Mosby was unable
to convince state or local lawmakers to provide the necessary funding for the unit, but her office
acquired $219,000 in grant funding from the Innocence Project in collaboration with the
Baltimore City defense attorney bar in 2018.654 In addition, her office secured federal grant
funding to finance the initiative in partnership with the University of Baltimore’s Innocence
Project Clinic and the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project in the same year.655 Two years earlier, the
unit had consisted of three assistant prosecutors, three administrative staffers, and an intern.656 As
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a result of the grant funding, Mosby hired an investigator to join the team, which at that point
also included an additional assistant prosecutor and two law clerks.657
Mosby’s Conviction Integrity Unit (CIU) has worked alongside the Innocence Project to
secure exonerations for nine individuals who were wrongfully convicted; In 2016, for example,
her unit helped exonerate Malcolm Bryant, a Black man who had been incarcerated for almost
two decades in connection to a murder committed by someone else.658 Mosby asserts her unit is
the first in the state.659 That assertion is somewhat misleading, as Bernstein, the former Baltimore
prosecutor, had established a conviction integrity unit prior to Mosby.660 Still, only 1.5% of
prosecutor offices across the country had a conviction integrity unit in 2017.661 Notably, well
over a third of the offices with a conviction integrity unit had yet to secure a single exoneration
as of 2017.662 Moreover, five units had only exonerated one person.663 Mosby’s Conviction
Integrity Unit examines at least 300 innocence petitions annually.664 Just a week after
establishing the SRU, Eraina Pretty, a woman who was imprisoned for 42 years, was granted
release from incarceration.665 The “post-conviction” motion was filed by Jan Bledsoe, on behalf
of the SRU, as well as Leigh Goodman and Lila Meadows, two lawyers for the University of
Maryland.666
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Mosby built on her Conviction Integrity Unit during the coronavirus pandemic. On
December 7, 2020, she established a Sentencing Review Unit (SRU).667 In the press release
announcing the new unit, Mosby’s office explained that “94% of the more than 800 prisoners
sentenced to life in Baltimore City are Black,” while Black individuals comprise under a third of
Maryland’s total population.668 According to the press release, if you are an incarcerated
individual hoping to have your petition for release reviewed, you will need to meet two
conditions: First, you need to be in the Center for Disease Control's high-risk category, as it
relates to COVID-19. Second, you need to have been incarcerated for at least 25 years under a
lifetime prison sentence and be older than 60. But if you are younger than 60 and spent at least
25 years for a lifetime prison sentence in connection to a crime that occurred while you were
under 18, you will also be eligible.669 In all capital letters the press release states:
AT A TIME WHEN BUDGETS ARE ALREADY TIGHT DUE TO COVID, IT IS A
WASTE OF MONEY TO INCARCERATE THOSE WHO POSE NO PUBLIC SAFETY
RISK: INDIVIDUALS OVER THE AGE OF 60 ARE NOT A THREAT TO PUBLIC
SAFETY.670
Mosby frames the unit as a measure to address racial injustice, the unique dangers
COVID-19 poses to the incarcerated population, and a way to save taxpayer money without
endangering the public. In that way, Mosby appeals to racial justice, the need for a sound “return
on investment,” and the urgency of the pandemic to build support for her efforts to reduce
incarceration. I learned from an interview participant that Mosby seeks “... to reduce mass
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incarceration [and] reduce racial disparities … all in a manner consistent with public safety.”671
Notably, Mosby hired Becky Feldman, the Former Deputy Public Defender of Maryland to lead
the Sentencing Review Unit.672
It should be noted that Sentencing Review Units are even rarer than Conviction Integrity
Units. The idea of a Sentencing Review Unit is a new concept advanced by just a handful of
prosecutors. Other prosecutors who have assembled similar teams include George Gascón, the
Los Angeles prosecutor, Aisha Braveboy, the Prince George, Maryland prosecutor, and Dan
Satterberg, the Seattle prosecutor.673 Mosby’s efforts on conviction integrity have extended
beyond policy. In February 2020, she lobbied the Maryland state legislature to pass legislation
obligating compensation for those who have been incarcerated and later found innocent or to
have received an excessive sentence.674 Demetrius Smith also spoke at the hearing. He had been
imprisoned for five years before he was found innocent by federal authorities and exonerated.
Smith said that receiving money to help makeup for the 5 years that were wrongfully imposed on
would give him the chance to build out the landscaping business he started after he was
exonerated.675
In addition to Mosby’s conviction integrity and sentencing review work, she has made
four other procedural reforms of note, which I will briefly review. First, recall from Part II
prominent prosecutor scholar and police prosecution advocate Vida B. Johnson’s reference to an
incident in July 2017, in which Baltimore police officers were recorded placing incriminating
evidence onto individuals they stopped.676 Mosby called for the re-examination of 100 cases in
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which those officers made the arrest and helped discard nearly half those cases within a month.677
Second, in December 2019, Mosby put together a document containing the names of 305 police
officers, 15% of the Baltimore police force.678 She asserted that her office viewed those officers
uncredible, and her prosecutors would not bring those officers forward as witnesses.679 Mosby
had submitted the document to the state Commission to Restore Trust in Policing.680 The
Baltimore police department’s “Commissioner of the Public Integrity Unit,” for his part, said he
had concerns about only 22 of the officers listed in the document.681 Puzzlingly, Mosby’s office
later said there was no guarantee her office would not rely on the officers listed in the document,
only that their credibility issues would be shared with the defense.682
Third, in October 2020, Mosby issued a statement prohibiting her junior prosecutors from
granting approval for officers to engage in searches without knocking on the door first — that is,
“no knock” warrants.683 The president of the police union called the decision “... irresponsible
and an overreach, though predictable.”684 Mosby’s decision came in response to the killing of
Breonna Taylor, an emergency room operator in Louisville, Kentucky who police officers
gunned down in March, 2020.685 Mosby, on the other hand, asserted that “the ends do not justify
the means.”686 Fourth, Michael Schatzow, Mosby’s top assistant, issued a memo in April 2017
directing junior prosecutors to keep in mind the potential deportation consequences in low-level
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cases against noncitizens.687 The memo encouraged junior prosecutors to consider not pursuing
such cases at all, and was issued in response to the Trump justice department’s crackdown on
undocumented immigrants.688 In short, Mosby’s procedural reforms include obtaining grant
funding for the Conviction Integrity Unit, establishing a Sentencing Review Unit, compiling a
robust “do not call” call list, opposing “no knock” warrants, and promoting a mindful approach
to the immigration consequences of prosecutions.
Despite Mosby’s apparently strong efforts on the issue of conviction integrity and
sentencing review integrity, a pair of interview subjects who watch court proceedings everyday
were critical: “She fought the defense attorneys, they’re the ones who made it happen, she fought
them to the end — and then took the credit.”689 In addition, the interview participants told me
Mosby has helped release about five individuals incarcerated for life as children. But, they said,
there are hundreds of other individuals in Baltimore who received lifetime sentences as children
and are still behind bars. The interview subjects also asserted that Mosby’s prosecutors have
continued to seek life sentences against “little kids, 14 year old kids,” while touting the
Sentencing Review Unit at the same time. The subjects expressed worry that fifty years from
now, the Baltimore prosecutor in office at the time can “use them as PR for themselves,” and
receive praise from the media just as Mosby did.690
The interview subjects asserted an additional criticism: They posited that Becky Feldman,
the former chief Maryland defender turned Sentencing Review Unit director for Mosby’s office,
was handling bail reviews in less than a month after she was brought on as the Sentencing
Review Unit chief. In other words, the subjects suggested Feldman was requesting judges keep
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individuals in jail, even though her role, as established in the press release, was “to head the
SRU.” By contrast, in Feldman’s previous role, she was helped to defend individuals. “Clearly
she [Mosby] takes very seriously the need to have people be put in and held in jail.”691
Still, these criticisms should not be taken to say that conviction integrity units are
necessarily a net bad: In 2017, a third of exonerations occurred as a result of in-house
prosecutorial conviction integrity units.692 But the information put forward by interview subjects
show the importance of activist oversight for monitoring the roll out of progressive reforms. In
addition, the interview subjects rejected the view that Mosby has stopped bringing cases based
on unreliable police testimony: According to the subjects, “She marches her ASAs [Assistant
State Attorneys] into court every single day telling the most ludicrous tales from the cops.”693
Mosby’s prohibition against “no knock” warrants also has a caveat. As Patricia DeMaio,
a top deputy for Mosby conceded, the decision to issue a no-knock warrant is made by the judge,
not the prosecutor.694 Still, DeMaio said the order sends a message to the Baltimore Police
Department that the prosecutor’s office does not condone those kinds of searches.695 Moreover,
the prosecutor determines whether or not to move forward with a case based on the police report.
Nevertheless, a defense lawyer in Baltimore stated that such warrants are rare. In addition,
officers, he said, can gently touch the door and mutter under their breath that they are present as
a way to get around a “no knock” prohibition.696
In short, Mosby’s efforts on the procedural justice plank have been extensive but not
every reform is as progressive as it appears. Interview subjects asserted that the Sentencing
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Review Unit chief was handling bail reviews, the “do not call” list was all for show, and a
defense lawyer also indicated the “no knock” prohibition was not going to make a big difference.
These critiques comport with a previous quote I mentioned from anonymous — that Mosby’s
“zeal obscures her complicity.”697 Still, Mosby has done a lot on the procedural justice plank: her
work on conviction integrity and sentencing review units have impacted the specific individuals
exonerated, including Malcolm Bryant; her response to the July 2017 evidence planting scandal
had an impact on the 50 individuals whose cases were dropped, while her “do not call” list, her
deputy’s immigration memo, and her “no knock” stance sent signals that her office stands for fair
conduct.
B. Carceral progressivism
Mosby’s work on police accountability has been controversial. Slansky notes that Mosby
emphasized police accountability when she ran for Baltimore City State Attorney in 2014. 698
Sure enough, Mosby’s unsuccessful prosecution in 2015 of the officers who took Freddie Gray’s
life catapulted her into the national spotlight. The prosecution of those officers was “the jewel in
her crown,” said a pair of interview participants sarcastically when asked about her record on
police accountability.699 But Mosby deserves credit for pressing charges against the officers
responsible for Gray’s death. Ultimately, a prosecutor cannot assure a conviction, they can only
bring charges and then either make a plea deal or prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, either to
the jury or a judge. Mosby also endured a significant amount of criticism, vitriol, and death
threats for her decision to prosecute the six officers who killed Gray.700

Note, “Paradox,” 750.
Slansky, “Changing Political Landscape,” 655.
699
Phone call with interview subjects (February 16, 2021) (on file with author).
700
Christina Carrega, “For the few black women prosecutors, hate and ‘misogynoir’ are part of life,” ABC
News, March 21, 2020.
697
698

126

The bigotry directed at Mosby affirms Davis’s observation that Black women prosecutors
often face sexist and racist attacks and greater pushback overall than white male progressive
prosecutors.701 The racism and sexism that Black women prosecutors confront also connects to
the role that stereotyping plays in reducing white support for progressive criminal justice reforms
that I mentioned earlier. Since prosecutors in the U.S. are publicly elected, racial bias within the
electorate presents an obstacle to progressive prosecution, as discussed in Part III.
Unsurprisingly, the criminal prosecution of the officers did not go over well with the Baltimore
police department, “It’s a fractured relationship,” said one officer.702 Moreover, five of the six
officers attempted to sue Mosby for prosecuting them.703 Trump also criticized Mosby for her
decision.704 In Baltimore, the police department handles the investigation, while the decision to
bring the case to a grand jury falls to Mosby.705 That commonly used approach is problematic
because a prosecution is only as good as the investigation; Asking an agency to investigate its
own is bound to be an issue, according to Slanksy.706
Mosby found early on that the police force was looking to sabotage the investigation, and
even the state police refused to provide meaningful support.707 In addition, she asserted the police
commissioner fumbled the investigation, while the mayor also undermined the investigation in
public comments.708 More specifically, Mosby asserted the police failed to search the officer’s
phone, despite the importance of obtaining that evidence.709 Ultimately, the acquittals and
dismissals that followed illustrate the broken nature of the police investigation process in
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Baltimore. Nevertheless, commentators still give Mosby credit; Slansky notes Mosby’s
willingness to bring charges differed from the Ferguson and Staten Island prosecutors’ lack of
action in response to the 2014 police killings of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, respectively.710
A reporter for The New York Times additionally asserts that one result of the investigation was
the Baltimore police department’s revision of their use of force policy and decision to put
cameras inside police vehicles.711
Still, other commentators have criticized Mosby’s record on police accountability.
According to one local outlet, her office only released police shooting investigation information
after pressure from a reporter for a Baltimore Sun reporter.712 As of now, there are 20 reports that
stretch from 2016 to 2019: “... The level of force used by the officers was justified and
reasonable,” asserts one report from 2016.713
There is also a 2017 report in The Appeal asserting Mosby’s office prosecuted a victim of
a police shooting. In June, 2015, the Baltimore police department fired 44 shots at a man named
Keith Davis Jr., hitting him three times in the process of a chase. Though wounded, Davis Jr.
miraculously survived. From there, Mosby’s office laid 15 charges into Davis, helped detain him
for almost a year pre-trial, and secured a conviction against him on a gun possession charge.
Later, the Baltimore office charged Davis Jr. for murder. But activists assert that evidence was
planted by the police department to frame Davis Jr. of a crime for which he was innocent. Davis
Jr.’s lawyer, in addition, said the prosecution disregarded the requirement to overturn important
evidence. Later, Davis was convicted based on the testimony of a so-called jail-house snitch who
Slansky, “Changing Political Landscape,” 656.
Hylton, “Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby.”
712
Brandon Weigel, “After nudges from reporter, Mosby’s office releases old use-of-force reports,”
Baltimore Fishbowl, July 24, 2019.
713
“Police Involved Shooting. Date: 4-28-16. Location of Shooting: 2000 West 41st. Investigated by:
Baltimore Police Department,” Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, accessed February 24,
2021.
710
711

128

said Davis had admitted to the murder in jail. The judge later ordered a retrial, and the Baltimore
prosecutors still did not drop the case.
The anonymous Harvard author claims that Mosby embodies the larger “paradox of
progressive prosecution.”714 According to the anonymous author of the Harvard Law Review
note, Mosby said “I heard your calls for ‘no justice, no peace’” to announce charges against
Gray’s killers but soon after asked her investigative deputies to intensify their drug enforcement
tactics on the street corner in which Gray was killed.715 Finally, interview subjects I talked to
posited that Mosby sometimes files charges against a police officer, and then goes on to rely on
that same police officer for testimony.716
In that way, Mosby’s track record on prosecuting the police has been beyond
controversial. She experienced public criticisms, political attacks, and even a lawsuit from huge
swaths of the criminal legal and political establishment in Baltimore and beyond when she
prosecuted the officers in the Gray case — not to mention hate mail and death threats from
members of the public. In addition, Mosby has shown transparency related to police shootings,
but reportedly because of media pressure. Finally, Mosby’s office prosecuted a police victim,
intensified drug investigations on the block where Gray was killed, and allegedly has used the
testimony of officers she has indicted. My view is that Mosby’s record on police prosecution has
been more focused on building up her image rather than consistently taking on the police.
Anti-carceral prosecution
Figure 5: Baltimore City incarceration rates717
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Mosby has introduced several bold initiatives that fall under the anti-carceral prosecution
plank of the ideal, the results of which are shown in Figure 5. Although these results are
significant, I assert that they are unsustainable. Mosby has implemented a juvenile diversion
program called AIM to B’More, 718 a non-prosecution order for marijuana,719and a broader
non-prosecution order during the pandemic.720 Near the beginning of her tenure, in 2015, Mosby
introduced a diversion program called AIM to B’More. 721 AIM to B’More gives eligible
individuals who committed a low-level felony drug crime the chance to avoid incarceration.722
For an individual to be qualified, they need to have been charged either with first time
felony drug distribution or nonviolent felony drug distribution.723 Moreover, candidates must fill
out an “amenability assessment.” If selected, the individual is put under supervised probation for
two years. During that period, they engage in 100 hours of community service, receive tutoring
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from a career coach, and are obligated to find and keep a full time job for a year. Once those
conditions are met and the probation comes to a close, a Baltimore prosecutor clears the
participant’s criminal record, according to the Baltimore City prosecutor’s website.724
In addition, the program description on the Baltimore City prosecutor’s website asserts
98% of participants in the program are Black and 86% are male.725 Moreover, the description
says 60% of individuals in the program are either younger than 24 or possess a high school
degree.726 Finally, the program description boasts, “Remarkably, AIM’s success rate is 68% and
its recidivism rate (32%) is well below the national average (68%). To date, 98% of AIM
graduates have full time employment.”727
A May 14, 2015 article in The Baltimore Sun and an article in WBAL TV say that while
supervised probation lasts two years, there is an additional year of unsupervised probation after
the enrollee obtains a full time job.728 In addition, the authors say the career mentorship is
provided by the Baltimore Center for Urban Families’ STRIVE initiative.729 Mosby’s AIM to
B’More program has received praise in the news media. In an ABC news article published in
March, 2020 the author asserts that while Mosby has faced an avalanche of hate mail as a Black
woman prosecutor, she still pushed forward on her agenda, with the AIM to B’More program as
an example.730 The Baltimore Sun article is also positive, “Mosby: New program gives
nonviolent offenders a second chance,” reads the headline.731 The article then mentions that 30
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individuals enrolled in the program at its outset.732 Finally, the AIM to B’More program received
positive coverage in the outlet Afro News.733 In short, Mosby’s AIM to B’More program is a
well-received incarceration alternative for low-level felony nonviolent drug offenders that
involves probation for three years with the opportunity for expungement.
Four years later, Mosby initiated another notable anti-carceral reform: In January 2019,
she issued a statement that her prosecutors would no longer prosecute marijuana possession,
irrespective of how much marijuana an individual possessed and irrespective of an individual’s
criminal record.734 This directive, which prosecutor scholars call a “non-prosecution order,” is
significant. As shown in the discussion of Chisholm and Nelson, Mosby is the only prosecutor
out of the three case studies in this article to take that measure. To be sure, Nelson’s civil citation
program and Chisholm’s drug court similarly reduce incarceration. But those programs have
eligibility criteria, which does not apply to Mosby’s non-prosecution order. An interview subject
with direct knowledge about marijuana legalization efforts I spoke to calls these refusals to
prosecute a certain crime or crimes “depenalization.”735 This policy is a signature feature of the
progressive prosecutor ideal.
The interview subject I spoke to noted that ballot measures have proven most effective
for marijuana decriminalization efforts.736 More specifically, she asserted that while multiple
states have decriminalized marijuana, only one state, Illinois, did so by way of the state
legislature. “Every single other state that has passed legalization,” she said, “did it through ballot
measures.”737 As Pfaff contends in his book, state legislators, for various reasons, are generally
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tentative to soften or eliminate criminal laws.738 With those difficulties in mind, Mosby’s
marijuana non-prosecution order shows that state legislatures and ballot measures are not the
only avenues through which to oppose criminal penalties for drug offenses.
While Mosby’s marijuana non-prosecution order was significant, the anti-carceral
measure she took during the onset of the coronavirus pandemic was even more noteworthy. In
March, 2020, Mosby stated that her office would no longer prosecute a set of low-level crimes,
including: Possession or attempted distribution for any drug including cocaine, heroin and
fentanyl, drug paraphernalia possession, prostitution, minor traffic crimes, urinating and/or
defecating in public, open container, and breaking into a car.739 The decision to stop prosecuting
these offenses indicates the coronavirus pandemic may have enabled Mosby’s office to push the
envelope. I learned from an interview subject with direct knowledge about Mosby’s office that a
staffer in her office had been setting the groundwork for this policy with Mosby’s support for a
while.740 The employee had visited Dan Satterberg and Larry Krasner’s office, met with drug
reform experts, and started putting together a memo for the executive team — the top staffers in
Mosby’s office. “But then,” the interview subject said “Coronavirus happened.” From there, the
interview subject told me, Mosby’s office got the “show on the road,” and implemented the
policy like a “shock doctrine.”741 Importantly, Mosby’s office said the order would stay in effect
when the pandemic ends.742
Notably, Mosby’s office also helped cancel about 600 open arrest warrants for the crimes
on the new non-prosecution list.743 Under the policy, if an individual committed a drug crime as
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well as a crime not on the list, the prosecutor would not press charges for the drug crime.744 An
interview subject who has familiarity with the office told me that while no assistant prosecutor
verbally protested that part of the policy, they sensed a degree of frustration among some junior
prosecutors.745 Namely because prosecutors often use a drug offense as an extra tool in their plea
bargain negotiations.746 That is, imagine you are charged for assault and drug possession. A
prosecutor might offer to make the drug charge disappear in exchange for your pleading guilty
for assault.747 That kind of plea bargain negotiating strategy, the interview subject told me, was
made impossible by the non-prosecution order. 748 An additional element was that the
non-prosecution order precluded treatment requirements, and applied to drug parole and
probation violations.749 “Not prosecuting means ... not prosecuting at all,” an interview subject
said. The policy was put in place by way of a memo to each office and conversations with the
section chiefs.750
In a major American city, to not prosecute drug possession regardless of amount and with
no sort of diversion programs. To not prosecute sex work, including the clients, the johns,
whatever. That hasn’t been before.751
Given the rarity of conviction integrity review units, it should not come as a surprise that
expansive non-prosecution orders are not a common occurrence.
Mosby’s AIM to B’More program and marijuana non-prosecution order were significant
reforms, while her expanded COVID-19 non-prosecution order and accompanying
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warrant-cancellation policy was unprecedented, according to an interview subject.752 Still, there
was pushback to these policies. First, Mosby’s marijuana non-prosecution did not go as smoothly
as one may have hoped. As Covert points out, the Baltimore police department kept making
arrests for marijuana possession even with the order in place.753 The Baltimore police department
asserted they would still arrest individuals in possession of over 10 grams of marijuana. The
result was what a Bloomberg journalist called a “catch-and-release situation.”754 Individuals in
Baltimore would get arrested, held in jail, and then let go after a prosecutor dismissed the case
within a day.755 For example, a pair of men were incarcerated and released soon after.756 A major
issue that arises from this lack of coordination is the fact that an arrest brings a criminal record.757
It is unclear whether Mosby’s COVID-19 non-prosecution policy has faced the same
challenge. In March 2020, the Baltimore Police department refused to answer Baltimore Sun
reporters Tim Prudente’s and Phillip Jackson’s inquiry about whether the police would stop
arresting people for the crimes on Mosby’s list.758 Similarly, Lary Hogan, the Maryland governor,
did not comment when asked whether he would follow Mosby’s request that he release every
state prisoner over the age of 60 and all imprisoned people set to finish their sentence within a
year.759 An interview participant who has familiarity with the policy asserted that “the police are
pretty happy with how it [the COVID-19 non-prosecution order] turned out.” The subject also
said drug possession arrests are down 75 percent.760
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While the pushback was immense, I spoke to progressive-orinted interview subjects with
direct knowledge of court proceedings in Baltimore City that the non-prosecution order did not
bring about the results that they wanted. The number of Baltimoreans held in pre-trial detention,
the subjects told me, has not decreased since the pandemic.761 “So what they’re doing is they’re
tacking on other charges,” the interview subjects informed me.762 For example, the participants
said that Mosby’s prosecutors have been charging people for distribution when the conduct is
right on the line between possession and distribution.763 Restated, the claim is that Mosby’s
junior prosecutors are filing charges for crimes that should be exempt from prosecution.
According to the interviewees, the problem is not that junior prosecutors are defying Mosby’s
order, but that Mosby wants them to engage in these practices: “When she came in, she cleaned
house. She’s not afraid to fire people,” they said.764
A July, 2020 article in The Appeal affirms the information provided by the interview
subjects. According to an original investigation in The Appeal, a third of defendants are still held
on no-bail.765 That is, they are jailed pre-trial without even the opportunity to post bail. The
Appeal posits this was the same proportion of people held without bail prior to the pandemic. To
be fair, the article also says the office has brought 34% fewer cases.766 Still the high number of
people put in jail during the pandemic is confirmed in a February, 2021 opinion piece in The New
York Times by Philadelphia Bail Fund director Malik Neal.767 There is an additional assertion in
The Appeal article that supports the claim of my interview participants: drug possession with
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intent to distribute was one of the three most prevalent charges for people who were not given
the chance to avoid pre-trial detention.768 Put differently, there is reason to believe that Mosby’s
office is charging drug possession cases as drug possession with intent to distribute because the
former crime is on the non-prosecution list, while the latter crime is not.769
In short, Mosby’s anti-carceral record has been a roller coaster. She established AIM to
B’More, a diversion program for nonviolent drug offenders, a marijuana non-prosecution order,
and a broader COVID-19 non-prosecution order. The marijuana non-prosecution order was
ignored by the police who decided to still make arrests, while it is unclear the extent to which
police ignored her COVID-19 order. In addition, critics have attacked Mosby for her record on
pre-trial detention during the pandemic, and asserted that her office is simply upcharging against
defendants for drug distribution, which is not on her non-prosecution list, instead of drug
possession, which is on the list. Nevertheless, Mosby has without question reduced incarceration
in Baltimore as a result of her AIM to B’More program, marijuana non-prosecution order, and
COVID-19 non-prosecution order.
The risks that come with not compromising
In closing, Mosby has endured an almost unimaginable amount of scrutiny during her
tenure as Baltimore City State’s Attorney. Mosby has established a conviction review unit, a
sentencing review unit, a diversion program called AIM to B’More, and two non-prosecution
orders. In the process, she has infuriated the Baltimore police department and been attacked by
the mayor. Moreover, the Governor issued an executive order commanding the state attorney
general to prosecute violent crimes in Baltimore.770 She also has been the subject of immense
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hatred, racism, and death threats. In addition, anti-mass incarceration advocates assert Mosby’s
assistant attorneys have continued a range of harsh conduct, including needlessly requesting
pre-trial detention against scores of Baltimoreans, including someone in a wheelchair.771 Given
the complexities of Mosby’s tenure — for example, she issued an expansive non-prosecution
order but also allegedly upcharged crimes that would have otherwise been on the list — it is no
wonder the anonymous Harvard author paints Mosby as emblematic of the “paradox of
progressive prosecution.”772 That is, Mosby’s tenure, for the anonymous author of the Harvard
Law Review note, conveys the larger message that progressive prosecutors are accomplices to
mass incarceration through their actions, while their rhetoric indicates they oppose the
phenomenon.773 But I argue that Mosby has been too uncompromising. Her decisions to issue
non-prosecution orders and prosecute the killers of Freddie Gray, while commendable, generated
immense backlash from more conservative actors, which constricted her anti-carceral agenda. In
turn, Mosby’s approach to progressive prosecution may not be workable over a sustainable
period of time or in Republican areas.

Iannelli, “As COVID-19 Permeates.”
Note, “Paradox.”
773
Note, “Paradox.”
771
772

138

VIII. THE COMPROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION
Chisholm, Nelson, and Mosby illustrate what I call the “compromise of progressive
prosecution,” which is distinct from the “paradox of progressive prosecution” claim advanced by
the skeptics. My hypothesis, based in the literature, is that Chisholm’s, Nelson’s, and Mosby’s
progressive success depend on the extent to which they rework office culture, coordinate and
collaborate with the police force, and form a compelling political message.
I find that coordination and collaboration, including with junior prosecutors, is the most
key factor for success. Furthermore, the need to collaborate with more conservative actors
prevents a prosecutor from prosecuting the police and restricts the degree to which they can
reduce incarceration, and to a lesser level, restricts the extent to which they can increase fair
process. Collaboration with the police force and judges also promotes a prosecutor’s ability to
reduce incarceration and increase the fairness of the criminal judicial process.
A central component of my argument is that the sustainable roll-out of anti-carceral
reforms and procedural justice policies requires a coalition with more conservative agents.
Reducing incarceration and increasing fair process, that is, demands cooperation from police
officers, judges, pretrial services, correctional officers, voters, junior prosecutors, prosecutors in
supervisory positions, state and local officials, and citizens. Nelson and Chisholm both secured
that cooperation because, unlike Mosby, they refrained from issuing a non-prosecution order and
have kept a greater rhetorical distance between themselves and the “progressive prosecutor”
label.
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Table 3: Progress toward the ideal774

The relatively uncompromising approach that Mosby took, detailed in Table 3, caused her
to lose the cooperation that she needed. Her COVID-19 non-prosecution order, marijuana
non-prosecution order, and decision to prosecute Gray’s killers mark points at which she broke
with the restraints imposed by the compromise of progressive prosecution. Breaking the core
compromises comes with costs. For example, the Maryland governor and Baltimore police force
undercut Mosby’s reforms and her junior prosecutors have continued a range of harsh practices
along the way. Mosby’s ambitious moves toward reducing incarceration and prosecuting police
misconduct, then, broke apart the coalition she needed in order to make a difference over time.
To be clear, Mosby has also made concessions. Her anti-carceral reforms, like Chisholm’s
and Nelson’s, are restricted to non-violent crimes. Moreover, despite Mosby’s “do-not-call” list,
her office has continued to call on these officers for testimony. Further, Mosby poured 15 charges
into Keith Davis Jr. who had been shot at 44 times by the police in June, 2015. Nonetheless,
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Mosby has taken on the police and has issued not one, but two non-prosecution orders.
Furthermore, although Mosby has embraced the “progressive prosecutor” label, she has also
deployed both the “return on investment” and “New Jim Crow” framings to justify her reforms
to the electorate.
Issuing a non-prosecution order annoys people: “It’s interesting to see how you can
achieve that change that you think is the right direction to go [reducing incarceration], without
necessarily having to jam it in everybody’s face that you’re here to save the world by fiat,” an
interview subject with close knowledge of the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office told
me.775 The quote supports my claim that issuing a non-prosecution order will start political fires
with police officers, legislators, junior prosecutors and judges that will be hard to put out. To
provide just one example, an interview subject with direct knowledge of the Baltimore City
State’s Attorney’s office informed me that many junior prosecutors in Mosby’s office were
skeptical about Mosby’s COVID-19 non-prosecution order.
By avoiding non-prosecution, a progressive prosecutor will be better-equipped to
develop the cooperation needed in order to introduce diversion programs, a conviction review
unit, and open-data projects over a sustained period of time and in politically tough districts. I
view diversion programs and civil citation programs as the most important progressive policies
because they reduce incarceration. Diversion programs are more likely to attain a broad-based
coalition because they are set by statutory law, and are in turn more collaborative than the
decision to override a statutory law. For example, Mosby’s AIM to B’More policy, Chisholm’s
drug court, and Nelson’s civil citation program all received backing from law enforcement. By
contrast, the Baltimore police force disagreed with Mosby’s 2019 marijuana non-prosecution
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order and continued to make arrests for that crime. Moreover, the governor challenged Mosby by
assigning a different prosecutor to manage violent crimes in Baltimore City. It is not clear how
the police have responded to Mosby’s COVID-19 non-prosecution order. It is a warning sign that
the police spokesperson refused to tell reporters whether they would continue to make arrests for
crimes on Mosby’s COVID-19 non-prosecution list.
Even though compromise prevents full realization of the progressive ideal, I am a
proponent of the progressive prosecutor project. This thesis indicates that despite the limits that
collaboration imposes, there is room for an elected prosecutor to move toward reducing
incarceration and increasing fair process over the long-haul: “the path isn’t impossible. The path
is hard,” an interview subject with direct knowledge of the Milwaukee criminal justice system
told me.776 To clarify, I do concede the skeptics’ claim that there is much less room, if there is
any at all, to move toward prosecuting the police. But a compromise is distinct from a paradox
because it is not that progressive prosecutors are all talk and no action: Nelson’s civil citation
program, Chisholm’s drug court, and Mosby’s AIM to B’More measure, while imperfect, have
made a difference.
Moreover, the concessions progressive prosecutors must make in order to build a
coalition depends on the context of the area. For example, Nelson’s decision to set up a
committee to approve death penalty requests rather than refuse to ever seek capital punishment
may have gone over well with conservative agents in her district for whom she depends upon for
cooperation on programs including civil citation, restorative justice, and conviction review.
Conversely, the death penalty has been abolished in Wisconsin and Maryland, which makes that
concession unnecessary for Chisholm and Mosby.
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The more generalizable necessary concessions include focusing progressive policies on
non-violent crimes, avoiding non-prosecution, not prosecuting police abuse, and a rhetorical
framing strategy that eschews a connection to the “progressive prosecutor” label. My findings
indicate that a progressive prosecutor must make at least some of these concessions in order to
develop diversion programs, conviction review units, open-data programs, and restorative justice
over time and in districts with a strong conservative presence. I will leave the matter of whether
the concessions needed to reduce incarceration and increase procedural justice over time and
across the country are worth it to the activists who ushered the new crop of prosecutors to power.
One area that this thesis does not cover but is worthy of attention is whether and to what
degree elected prosecutors can pursue other facets of carceral progressivism, namely prosecuting
landlords, politicians, corporations, and rich people. My findings indicate that prosecuting police
abuse while working with the police on reforms is impossible namely because of the prosecutor’s
dependence on the police force. On the other hand, county prosecutors are not dependent on
landlords or corporations and may have more space to prosecute these actors for wrongdoings. A
second avenue for further research would be an article exploring what the best strategy is for
framing progressive prosecution in service of short-term and long-term success. I will now
provide a set of recommendations to help progressive prosecutors be more effective.
Best practice #1: Collaborate with the police force
I recommend that county prosecutors build a good working relationship with the police
force by working together on reforms, letting a state level official take on police crimes, and
being communicative with the police commissioner. Developing a good relationship with the
police is imperative because a resistant police force restricts an elected prosecutor’s ability to
reduce incarceration. Prosecutors are also dependent on the police for programs that increase fair
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process. When it comes to prosecuting the police, prosecutors are also dependent on the police.
Since prosecutors are dependent on the police to make progress, they should build a good
relationship with the police. One way to do so is to work together on reforms, such as a drug
court, a mental health court, or a civil citation program.
My second recommendation is for progressive county prosecutors to not prosecute police
abuse. I instead suggest that the county prosecutor allow the state attorney general, with the help
of the state police, to prosecute police crimes. A second suggestion for strengthening the
relationship with the police is for the prosecutor to keep in close contact with the police
commissioner about any and all reforms they plan to implement, including ones that they think
the police commissioner would support. A relevant cautionary tale is that Nelson’s data
transparency project caused issues with the police force because she had not contacted them
before releasing the data.
A critic might assert that it is outrageous to suggest that a progressive prosecutor build a
strong working relationship with the police force by working with the police on reforms, shifting
police prosecution to an external actor, and staying in close contact with the police
commissioner. The critic might add that it would be regressive to work with the police because
of pervasive police corruption, killing, brutality, violations of constitutional rights, lying on the
witness stand and racial profiling. Moreover, they might assert that the local prosecutor has the
authority to take on police abuse, which makes it incumbent on them to do so. Finally, the critic
could say that the state attorney general could be a Republican, which makes shifting the
responsibility an ineffective solution.
Indeed, a local prosecutor could focus their efforts on police prosecution and handle that
role internally. In my view though, prosecuting police crimes comes at the cost of reducing
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incarceration over time. The way out is to have the state attorney general, who will ideally be a
progressive, handle the prosecution of police crimes. But the critic would be right to say that is
not always the case. Some elected prosecutors, such as Nelson, may find that they need to decide
between prosecuting police violence or reducing the incarceration of ordinary people. I suggest
that progressive prosecutors emphasize reducing incarceration instead of prosecuting police
misconduct. Reducing incarceration will ensure that more vulnerable people will be able to vote
and organize in their communities. In that way, the benefits incarcerating fewer people are
greater than the benefits of deterring police misconduct. In short, I suggested that progressive
prosecutors collaborate with the police by working together on anti-carceral reforms, not
prosecuting police violence but instead asking an external actor to do so, and keeping in touch
with the police commissioner.
Best practice #2: collaborate with judges
I suggest that elected prosecutors develop a good working relationship with the judiciary.
Since judges make the final determinations about bail and sentences, it would behoove the
elected prosecutor to build a harmonious relationship with judges. I have found through my
research that the best way to do that is to work with judges on reforms. For example, Nelson
worked with judges on her civil citation program and Chisholm worked with judges on his drug
court. Chisholm also helped judges secure federal funding. It has helped Chisholm that he is an
experienced prosecutor, so judges know him. In turn, elected prosecutors who have experience
working in their district are well-equipped to build a strong relationship with judges. My core
suggestion, though, is for the prosecutor to communicate with judges about reforms, not surprise
them, and assist them with their specific goals, for example by helping elected judges secure
funding from the federal government.
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Best practice #3: collaborate with junior prosecutors
My third suggestion is that progressive prosecutors focus on building up morale in their
office, while also pushing junior prosecutors in a more progressive-minded direction. I have
found that advocates are correct that changing the internal incentive structure, hiring
progressives in supervisory positions, and implicit bias training programs help stifle punitive
office norms. Elected prosecutors, though, should tread with caution when it comes to firing
junior prosecutors. Firing junior prosecutors in large numbers can create a morale problem. The
office needs a high morale to take on the challenges of prosecuting in accordance with fairness
and prosecuting fewer ordinary people. More specifically, a good progressive prosecutor should
require their staff to review police reports quickly, not overcharge, dismiss cases based on
unreliable evidence, not discriminate, refer defendants into diversion programs, and remain
aware of the immigration consequences of prosecutions. These practices require more nuance
than seeking a high conviction rate. I suggest the elected prosecutor not fire too many junior
prosecutors and also always remind their team that a high conviction rate does not advance the
mission of the office.
Best Practice #4: Frame reforms the right way
Developing support from the electorate and from state and local officials is integral for
progressive prosecution. Building political support for a progressive model of prosecution,
however, is not without its challenges. I have found that the only way to do so is for the
prosecutor to not accept the progressive label, as Chisholm and Nelson have done. By taking this
step, citizens and elected officials will not see progressive reforms as ideologically motivated.
Scholars point out, however, that pretending to not be a progressive but acting progressive is
demoralizing for activists. In turn, an elected prosecutor must balance a strong relationship with
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progressive activists and movement groups while not alienating conservative citizens and
officials. One way they can do that is through transparency about their plans. But ultimately, the
best strategy for framing progressive prosecution for short-term and long-term success is an open
question, and another avenue for further research.
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